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PREFACE
Ihi psrisnry

ef this pap«3r i* to disuse Pctftidtent CImr*! Abdul

{tester's diplMMtie and politieal MUtimis wi^ the Westem w^ld and l^e
Seviet Onion* Hassan's ai^roach in his dealing »ith the gx«at p(»«8r$ has
aadto hita one ef the nost «(»)t7evetslal peys^lities el CMiteaporary inter
national politics* As an exai^leg we see ^at nyeh has been said in ths
Aneriean pvess ab«ut his fexeisn pelieies* In mny easesf tuAiat has been
said in tlM prass htm has been a66eB|>anied by besU aiseimeeptions el mhat
have been tl« tamer and dkMfHir netives behind

United Anb ReiHiblie

least's stands* Playing tNi role of a neutral politieal leader* Ni seens
to i»eSllate betmen tiMi posing pOMer bloos for seaie s^ of daiHc» deir*
ions aietives of his (mr* Sons Awirioan press (such as, fi^ example* tiie
and World Report) has bmnded hin as a "CeoKmist stooge" or a
^fanatio Arab nationalist*** In additiafi, his i^ur^se of Cooraunist ams to
stiengthen his amy proepted V^aimm newMMin to aoeuse hia of opening Mid
dle Eastern doors to Connunist iaperialisa* These eharaeteri2ati<ms of
Hasser's personality and polioy, it sesns, have resulted priaarily fros
Msstem misunderstanding of Maeser's ttm intentimis*
It is not intended in ^^s thesis to criticize the ISnited States <Sovesfisent, €» any other iNisteiin gove^riBentf

im its dealings with^ U*A.R.

leader* Rather, this paper reflects Urn autilierU desire to straighten out
Biseemceptiffins and to el^nata misunderstandings* It is hoped ^at a new,
ecsisl^etive Nsstexn policy toward the Middle Bast will finally Mwirge*
Su^ a policy would sten out of deep ui^rstandin^ of Middle Eastern poli
ties and would realize ^at Arab nationalism has a coeamcm destiny with the
i$astem world, and that, if President Nasser as the leader of this dynaaic
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CHAPUR I
A (aASCE AT IHS PRE«RI¥0WJnC3HAmr iSH>T
Xi9i

td im^xsttnd niiy Sgnnpt* wai4»x

leadtcship of CiMMl Abchil

Ht«8«x» has ^*P9lspsd its oAi^ pmdtitm vis<««*iris tl» &r«st Peiisi^ em*
timp&mrf iatoanaationtal £«l«ti«»i9» sjiielt 9m c^iraotsri^d by psrsistsat
6^flists» » slai# el tiis histsty of me4»m igri^t ptim t& Hit «»y ecMs
<i'»tat ef July 23»

is semtldtisi ustssssiry*

Hist^istts imm gsiMixsiiy sfytsd i^t tlM i^yn histsty sf Bgiypt bt*
gan with llipeisim's invasien ei^fimmttf in

Althoisfh a mmktx el

px«t«3cts tm ^ invasisn «•<» 9iwn> soeh as eoriselidittos tiM pesiti«i tf
the i^yptiaii fewnmnsatt it MIS hsiisvid lhat tiui xsal pagpmm hehini
Fttnsh sj^ditiim was Aip#ls«a*s 9mM plan te tsalisi MNKrid dsniiiatiwi* ^
NapeJUiwi WIS

mil awsxs that

a plan seuU not ^ at^isvsd wi^sut sa

lting tiM Meat ^st«
Itiila Mapeism sxtsa^d Fnash emtxel &mx §9i^t» Gtast Britain s«al*
i«sd tiiat hav intsxtsts ia £(Mlia Mii* in a gssNit daagsy* llntsy an ailian^
ms iMide bslaMNMi @iNiat i^itaia and iim Ottemn i^pitf-vtoish had sstabiistwd
totalafls
seek

Bfypt sines lSI.7-MHrtisfshy firaress el^ twe seuntrits wettld

dsfsat el Vtm fxtneh* In 1861,

aiUsd treops siss^iad in

aehisving tiiis pturpess, ai^^ l^ixts-ytaar ztils el Fmnes evtt Eg^t mas
tn<ted*^ l^mv9Tp ffapelsim iwis able te sow #i« seed el Frencli

Wastsyn

influtni^ in the e^try*^
1 I.A. Spsissr* jlgi Iteitsd States and the SEE liil (Co^dge, Mass.t
Haxvard University Press» l55f)7 RP» 43-44.
2 l*vii^ Seda* and ttiwjld ^enbexg* Bshind the Bovptian Strfiinx (Mew
Yexkt ChiJLtwt Coapanyt 196CI), p* 15*
3

4
llfliiMMd All* «fi to

Ttoklsh ejUHpaSfii ig«inst

isim F]»neh» ltd to 1832 « iniectteful idLlittfy nitifiy In Wswt tgttost
t^xkish

lite was Itft htlpless *^«n arltlsh troc^s evaouatad the

eeimtsy* In 1806

Sultan of Bixkty umrillii^ly emflzned Moaned All as

Sj# Vimsey ®f iSgypt#
IXiiftog his £«i§fi ®f f®pty-t3««t years* IWjaBwd ^li bailt wUSi liie help
of lojpiign assert and t«#uii«iaii6 a stf^ amy and navy. Ht Mpleyad his
•Ifleltnt asuy alnest e«Matlniiimsly«

exushed tlw Wahabl mv&it to Araibia.

The l^ish Sultan refused te mms^m hto as the viett@y of Syria and the
Iterea*-^ title which had been afteed

bttween M^md All ami tlie Sal*

tan befeote the E§vpt^n fleet pirtieipated* togei^r wltdi its Turkish
0e»mtes|:>art* to the tettle of Nainttoo (Oetober S^* 1827) against the
bii»d fleets ef Citato* Fi^nee* and l^ssia* M a result* Vk^uHMd All
Kirehed over Syria and was steiqped Jast shfiort &f^ emnqfUMst ef Ti«rit»y it
self beeatise ef totenwntiim by the great pi^rs*^
H^hamid All* semrally regarded as <^e feunder of no<itom Bgypt* totro*
dueed aany Meded referee in eeeNROBle* a9ri<»ilitortl> and ellitary affairst
but th«se tefoms c^ld not keep paee with a

state and

his death

in 1849* the cmintry (Nsee agato lapsed tote pelitieal turmeil* His rule was
neildier e<^nipt n&r wistefal and was free froR deatoatlcm ef the great powers,
to contrast* all his suceessors* ending with Kii^ Far^k in 1^2, were incom
petent* oorrupt* and under heavy foreign tofluenee.^
Hi& iuBediattt sueeesser, $a*id, granted Ferdtoand de Lesseps* an

3 Speiser* fg. eit». pp. 43-44.
* Philip K, Hitti* History £f iga Aaraibs (lUHidont SiieMillan and Co.,
1958), pp. 722-25.

s
aiBbitious Fx«n^ engin«tr, th« etmesssion to build tho Bmz Cansi in 1^*

In 18^ Sa*id was sueceoded by Issaiii vi^e possossod a laigo nunber of
shates in tho

Canal Ceopany • Tho Canal was eoi^lotod tni qponod to

traffie in 1869. Its censtrtiotitm cost U6 nillioii, of idiic^

igyptian

gimttmnt paid a^t one-half* Soon XsMil*8 extiravagant livit^ sado hin
sell his shares in t^e ec»pany to the Baritish govexiBaent» thus i»icii^ Bri*
tain a

idM3whol^» of tho

Canal Conijany and a possosscKr of en

stalQK in %^tiaft affairs. By 1679 Um govtimnint*s indob^<l»i«s
had xeaeiMd UOO failli<m» n^toy CMfod chiefly to B^tish and Ffondh shato*
holdersi

eoyuRitJ^ tms on^ ¥0x90 of bafdcm^toy* Ftmwiag f&x thois' in-

vostaente» Burt^an exodite^s uxgod the fovemwnts of @to«t Britain ami
France to take paronpt aetitm in ^rdor to seoire payaent of the ^bt* C<ki80*
(fuentlyt tite im govozraeonts forood tho abdioati^in of Isaail in favwr of
his son Tewfiq and

began t& assert oontrol of Egyptian finaftoiil

policy, the two govesiosents 1l'?«K«diately sptmsored a progrsa of recofanlza*
tim of %yptiatt finances* Booauso financial refora MIS slovwr in progress
than tms ojipootod,^ i^»atient Fron«ii eeasod to participate In it* leav
ing Egyptian affairs to @reat Britain*^
Ihe iapositi<»i of fiurelfn control over Bgyptian internal affairs led
to the AhRMid Qrabi affair in 1^1. Qrabi* a goiwral in the Bgyptian amy*
revolted against Htm govermsent because it failed to rid Itself of foreign
influence and because it ms csom^t* Otabi's forces oc^ied Alexandria
and openly idiallenged Tewfiq. This brcRight an iamdiate protest and

3 The Royal Institu'te of International Affairs* (hereafter abbrevia^d
as R.I.I.A.) M
M
^yyoy (Undont
Oxford University Press* 1958}* p. 183.

6

ultimate Iron Great Britain. As Orabi refused to surremJer to the gove^mEsent in Cairo* the British fleet, upon Tewfiq*s e<msent» b^ibarded Alex
andria and the British tro«ps to<^ possessimi of the city* Orabi*s revolt
endted in failure and British occiiqpation of the country fceguni and for the
next seventy years Great Britain exercised stresig influence over Egypt.^
*

*

«-

The Sjdant a territory stretching from Uganda in the south to the
borders of Egypt at ladi Haifa in the north, had been an ^rvptian province
since ^e reign of Me^aned Ali. The British, w^o had exercised a dominat
ing influence in tite Egyptian gavezrment followii^ the C^bi revolt, had
maintained garrls<ms in the ^dan. A revolt led by the Mahdi, a fanatic
Sudanese religious leader, defeated a force of Egyptian troops led by a
British officer. In 1893 the Mahdi troops were defeated in the Battle of
Qadurman by a c«&bined force of British and Egyptian troops, and the entire
^dan was brought uncter the Anglo-Eg'i^tian control.7
This control was formalized by the Af^lo-Sgyptian Ccxiventicm of 1899.
llie convention created a joint British-Egyptian goverraoent in the Sudan
under the form of a cond^inium, which Lord Cxmmt, British Agent and
c<m8ul general in ^ypt, described as a ''hybrid form of government hither
to unkn<»Mn to international jurisprudence."®
*

*

#

^ President Gamal Abdul Nasser, expressing his bitterness against
Tewfiq*s complicity with the British, statedt "The British had occupied
Egypt wi^ ^e tacit cmisent of Tewfiq following the patriotic revolt led by
General Qrabi...Tewfiq feigned acceptance of the reforms demanded by Orabi,
M^ile openii^ t^e doors to the British «^o sought a pretext to justify an
occupation of Egypt." Garaal Abdul Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign
Affairs. Jantiary, 1955, p. 199.
^ R.I.I,A.,
cH.
419-20.
® Ibid., p. 421.

7
At the outbreak of World War I, Hgypt y&s declared a British Protecto»ate, a saasure aimed at ending Turk-sy's nc^ainal sovaxeignty over Sgypt.

The Sritish declaration stated*
His Sritannic Majssty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
givts notice thst, in view of the state of war arising out of 'ttia
action ®f Turkey, %ypt is placed under the pxotacticm of His
Majesty and »idll henceforth constilaite a British Protectorate....
His Majesty's Goifexnawnt 5d.ll adopt all masurss necessary for the
defense of igypt, and protect its inhabitants and interests.^
Wten the mt entted in 1918, %yptian nationalistic feelir^, *#ileh had
been repressed by the British, burst into actiw lift under the leadership
of Sa*ad Zaghloul. Zaghlmil deaamited e<^let% and isn^diate independence of
the ctMintry. In 1919 he went to^ Paris Peace Conference and laid his
countiry*8 demnds before the (Sreat Peters. Zaghlmil's oissi^ proved fruit
less. However, under increased Egyptian national pressure. Great Britain
agreed t© end the Protectorate

1922, with the cmdition tiiat British

forces remain in ^e cointry Wfitil 1936.
Many masures had been introdkiced to the country after 1922, such as
the institsition of a cimstitutimal goverraaent, tiie establishflaent of a c^aprehensive state-su|:^^ted ecbication, and the sending of diploamtic nissiewis
abroad, ait Egyptian nationalists did not dxqp their deaand for full and
unconditi^l independence. The Wafd, a party founded by Sa*ad Zaghloul,
contiraied to cai^jaign vigorously for ttie eanplete »*ithdra««l of all British
troops and tiie restoration of the Sudan to Egyptian rule. After a (tocade of
continued struggle on the part of the Wafd, Great Britain and Egypt con»
eluded a treaty on Au^st 26, 1^6, replacing the unilateral deelarati<»i of

9 Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East |n Crisi8**A Histori
cal and DoctBBentarv Review (Syracuse, N.Y.i Syracuse University Press,
I9597rp. 75»

8

1922. Ihe new treaty wis designed to establish a aors cordial relationship
t^tMsen the tm countries.^®
The 1936 treaty finally recognized %ypt*s cc^lete indepenctence*
Moreover, it provided for the reaoval of British forces fro» Cairo and Alex
andria to the S^ez Canal Zi^te, British spcmsorsh^ of Egyptian s^mbership
in the League of !^ti®is, ami tiie ahandonnent by Britain of the right to
protect minorities on Eg^tian ^rritory. Great Britain, hme^r, reserved
the right to utilize Eg^tian eoiMBunieation facilities and the right to
defend Egypt extemally, wliich included -Gie use ©f Egyptian sell for this
puxpose. Ihe futore of

aidan wes a natter of ftirther negotiatiims.^^

^en the treaty was signed, many ^yptian patriots loelconed it as a
step toward regaining complete natl<mal sovereignty. Kmsever, the outbreak
of World War II proved to

scxsethlAg else. %^t's desire to raaintain a

neutral posititm between the tmrring parties «as handicapped by the exlstance of ^is treaty. More over, QSYP^ once agalji i^casae a major base for
British tafoqps.^^
Durii^ tt^ war period, Sritish limjlveEMint in Egyptian affairs wient so
far as to present King Farouk in February 1941 with an ultimtira recpestir^
the disnissal of the existing govermoent for showing pro-Italian tendencies

w.B. Fisher,

Middle East (l-ondon* Utethuen & Co., 1956), p.150.

J.C. Hurewitz, Dipl«aaev in t|w Wear and Middle Ea^t - A Doaimentarv i^cordi 1914-1956 (I^dont NostranT^., imTTh' 203-lI.
Colonel Sadat, Nasser's partner in the Revolution of l^,st»BiKd
up his disgust at this situati<m by writing i "At the ^tbreak of hostili
ties, Bgyptian policy had been defined....but in fact it seened e<|uivocal,
because t^e idea of neutrality tMas precluded by Egypt's military obligatis^
under the 1^6 Treaty. How cwld ^ypt rei&aln rmitral, Mhen British troops
occupied tiie iwhole cmintry and controlled the bases, G(»nunicati<ms, ports,
etc." Anmr El-Sadat, ftevolt m the Nile (New Yorki John I^y, 1^7),
p.

and its feplacesent witi) a Hbfdist gwemment headed by ttustafa Nahas*
The demand teas granted, and Nahas eoi^rated with ^e British until 1944
when he was ousted by iiiie King.^^
Hms at the end of World i^ar II, ttie 1936 treaty seemed but a veil
unc^r «diieh foreign ocoipati^ of the country c«jld be sanctioned. Egypt
then renewed its demands for

iensediate witiidrawal of all British troqs,

inciudii^ tiiose statiwiad in the Suez Canal Zme, and for its union vdth
the SiKian under the Eg^^tian Croum* Negotiation for the revisitm of the
treaty l^gan. Hoover, Egyptian atteiqpts to charge "Ute treaty in such a
way as to obtain coqslete sovereignty and imiependence for the country niet
str^ British resistance. On July 11, 1947, Egypt took

case to the

Security Council of the United Natims, pleading that the presence of Bri
tish trm^s on Egyptian soil was incoiqpatible with ^ Charter and the
spirit of tite United Hatictfis.^^ Mo action was taken by the Council, and
the matter ms left for future negotiation between the two countries in
volved.
Unpromisir^ negotiatiois between Great Britain and Egypt dragged m
for three years. Finally, <hi October 15, 1%1, Egypt unilaterally abrogated
the treaty of 1^6, ami declared that it wcKild no longer be bound by the
treaty. It also denounced the C^dominium Agreement on the Anglo-Eg^tian
Sudan} the Egyptian parliament proclaiiaed the Sudan as a territory under
the Egyptian Crown.^^ Britain vigorously repudiated these measures and

l^on l^itish advice, Egypt did not declare war on liie Axis until
April 1945. Because Prime Minister Ahmed Maher declared tiie war, he was
assasinated the r»xt day wdiile attending a parliament session. R.I.I.A.,
SSBl* £il*» P» i®"''
United Natiwis, Yearbook gf the United Nations. 1947-1948.
Anwar El-Sadat,

cit.« p. 118.

10

consldlered herself not boui^ by theffi*

Ali^migh aany Astern observers had

inteaprtted these actions by Hgypt as being attei^ts by tite g^mrrment t©
divert fwblic c^inion from the defeat of Egyptian troqjs in the Palestine
vrar, there is reason to believe that the wain cause for -Uiese acti^ was
an Egyptian aspiratl^ to assert the right to be severeign in its &m
country.^®
Toward the end of 1951, tiie goverra^nt allowed police and irregular
guerilla forces to attack British military posts in the Canal one. The
toitish forces retaliated by attackii^ an Egyptian police station in
Isfflailia and killed sewnty policea»n. On January 26, 1952 anti-British
rioters dem^strated in the streets of Cairo, and soon turned into uncon
trolled mobs taistiir^ many buildli^s and killii^ thirteen Britishers.
King Farmik dissaiissed the ^fd govermsent for inability to ccmtrol the
turbulent situatim. In the following five ®©nths Cairo becaae a scene of
changes of indecisive g<Mrer»a%nts. Finally, m July 23, 1^2, the "Free
Officers", an (Hoganization of nationalist officers in the Eg^^tian army led
by General

Naguib and Colonel Ganal Abdul Nasser, put an end to

the alsost chaotic situatiwi by overthrowing the regime of King Faraik.^®
Ihe new regine, headed by ^irteen army officers knotm as the Revoluticmary
CoBi^nd Council (BCC), introduced many reforms in the social, econosic, and
political fields during its first few weeks in office.
*

#

*

J^rfm S. Badeau and R.H. Nolte,
awroence of Medem Eqwt (Head
line Series, toiber 98, April 1953), pp. 22-3.
IM

Tiflws. Jamiary 27, l%2, p. 1.

Ibid., July 24, 1952, p. 1.

Before turning to the revolutiimary era» it Is necessary to take a
brief

at Egypt's z«lati<ms with the Itaited States and the Soviet Ifrii^

prior to the Revolution,
Fxlor to H^ld ^r II, the United States tmas little eoncen^d with
political events in the Middle Fast. Certain American gr^Hips, it is true»
engaged in such activities as missionary, eckicational and eoramrcial. Ihe
war brcKifht mit Aaeriean strategic aiKi political interest in

area. Al»

most on the eve of tlie attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt cbclared
that the defense of tiie Middle Hast was vital to American security. Presi(k!nt Truaan, in April 1946, observed ^at the Middle East, an area with vast
nalairal resources and a strategic locatitm, was closed of states that
were "not strcMfig enough individually or collectively to withstand pi^rful
aggression."^^ This was cmsidered a c^ftfiiwation of Roosevelt's declara
tion of the iai¥>ortance of the Middle East to Hvs United States.
In genez«l the post-war era was characterized by increasing American
involvement in the affairs of the area. This eiMrgence of U.S. interest in
the area was related to two basic develo|»ients. The first was the presence
of tjte Soviet threat in the Middle East exeiplified by Soviet re^sal to
with^w its troops froBt nortl»3m Iran and the Soviet pressure on Greece
and Turkey in 1946. United States' promises to Greece and TUrkey tiiat it
wmild assist them to deter Russian aggressiwi by force if necessary helped
to ease f^ssian pressure on ti^en. Professor Robert Strausz-Hupe, stressing
this develoi^nt in inrii^ing liashingtcm to play a i&aior role in the affairs
of the Middle East, statedt

Ernest Jackh, Background of the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.t
Cornell University Press, 1952). p. 397.

12
Even without the Soviet eliallenge, the United States
stiil might heve been dravn into the affairs of the area.
Yet Ajaexican Initiative would have been confined to a mintor
of 1(^1 and highly seleetive issues, and even in l^se the
United States would have confined itself to its txaditiwial
roles of iBoderator, offering its good offices before the bar
of «w>rld c^inion ar^ counselling the pr^er legal procedurei
of trader» seeking oarkets and scMnd investments; and of
genermis wentor, endowif^ schools and spreading the blessings
of universal» secular educaticm. The United States can still
play these roles and, indeed, does play them. It has been
forced, howeirar, into another unaccusttKaed and peril<ms part,
that of the strategic ringnaister of •Oie Middle Hast.^®
The secmd develtjpasent ms the decline of the pcwwr and prestige of Great
Britain and France in the area after World lar II. The dudndling of influ
ence cf the 1»*o Hur«^an powers

desasstrated by the grant of Independ

ence to Syria and Lebanon by France, and by the conflict between Great
Britain and Egypt over termination of the 1936 treaty? ttiis devel(^:»aent led
the United States policy inkers to seek mys to fill the "vacuus." The
United States, beii^ the leader of tiie Astern bloc, realized that the posltl«i of the Middle East was the keystone to any effective Western defense
plan against Conawnist expan-siwa.^^
Jack Winecour, a Middle Eastern affairs specialist, coafiimed that it
was the United States rivalry with the U.S.S.R. that brought American
er^agement in the area*s affairs, but

also pointed out that there exist

ed a British-American rivalry »Alch resulted fiij® British jealCMsy over
United States expanding influence and British contacting power In an area
»i4tere she used to be the unchallenged master. He explained that the latter
rivalry was overshadowed by the overall conflict with the Soviet lAiiati in

20 Robert Strau8a»-ftipe, "The United States and the Middle East,"
Tensions In the Middle £ast edited by Philip W. Thayer (daltisioret The
John Hqpklns Press, 1^), p. 4.
Ibid" P» 5.

13

vilileh botii V^shingten and Ltmdtm wetre engaged* Ite believed ^at tiiis British-Aaerican rivalry contributed to the advent of an "inctependent Amsrican
"ZL
policy" t^(i«rd the Middle East*
The United States* pursuance of an Siidepemient policy toward ^e Mid
dle East was demonstrated in the question of Palestine* In 1947, ^e United
States played a leading role in securing lAiited Nations* approval of a
resolutiewi recoraoending partiti(»i of Palestine into a Jewish state and an
Arab state* British preliminary resistance to enforce a decisicn was e«intered by a United States su^estion of an international tru$teeshi|3 for
Palestine. SQ^en the Uni^d States proposal failed of acceptance, Presidk»nt
Trumn recognised tiie new Jewish state upon its ^claration of inctependence
in 1948*
AiBerica*s role in establishii^ the state of Israel and its stahsmg si^
port of that state since 1948 antagcmized the Arab world and vias b<»ind to
beccxne ^ne of the oajor obstacles to friendly relations between the United
States and the Arab Middle East* this observatimi was particularly appli
cable to 1^0 relations be^en ^ypt and the United States* Tha hunilia*
tifflfts suffered by the ^yptian amy in the Palestine war in 1948, as related
by ilie Egyptians, «ns due to the en^iy's superiority of BOitern weapons* The
people of %ypt were c<mvinced bey^ any doubt ^at Western refusal to sup
ply tiieir a3HBy with WKlern aims vas ootiwited by the Aaeriean govemaaent's
cksire to prasenre the existence of the state of Israel. The Egyptians
were also indignant at the extensive United States econoeic aid to tite Jew
ish State* The U.S. dollar was ccmsidered a major factor in saving

^ Jack Winocour* "The United States and l^e Middle East,**
Eastern Affairs. August-Septenrber, l%4, p.

Middle
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Israeli Qcmmnf fsm dventnal ianlcruptcy.^
B|vpt abrogated the ti^aty of

with Ortat Britain m Octobar

15, 1951, Oni1»d States S#cr«tary ©f State Dean Achasai ariticiiwd Egypt's
aetidn as ci^trary to ini^matlonal law.^"* Hjis stateaent ms interpretdci
by

as fttfther evider^e ©f active American ^ositi^ to the ccwn-

tary*s »8tional asplrati®Rs.
The success of the North Atlantic Treaty Csrganizati^ in cmittainir^
Soviet pwwr in Eurof?^, followed by the cecmunist aggressiai in Korea, led
lUsshii^t^ to iiie conclusi^ ttoat Ifestern influence wist be oiaintained in
the Middle Bast. Siiuje it was obvit^s that the "old exclusive seiii-ii^rlal
trsaty relationships were
Britain

l<M^er tenable," the Wnited States and Great

id^ of ntiltUa'texiil refiimal def^ise pacts as an
wilii ti» Westesn bloc replacing

old iraperial

Oa this basis the tteited States, together witii Great Britain, France,
and Turkey, presented the Egyptian government witii a pr^osal to cj«ate a
Middle East Defense OrganiaMtion a few days after %ypt's aharogati^ of
treaty of 1936. Bgypt was told that she c<»ild join the Organizatitm as an
e<^sl partner mltk

other petsers and that <4ie British tro<^s in idte Canal

ZfflT-' rjQuld be replaced by a ct^ined force of ttie Hm countries I.e. the
Iftiited Stitas, France, lUrkey, Gsreat Britain aiHi Igypt. Eg^t*s "resentiaent

^ Between 194i and IW,Israel alone received half a billicm dollars
in eiNmeiBie aid fr^ i^e United States as against $3C^ railliim to all ^e
Arab cmintrles. A,J. Meyar, "^flections c«i An^rican Hcontadc Policy in
^ mm» net,- Kiddle Eattern Affairs. June-July, 1959, p. 233.
^ IM In

October 18, l»l, p. 1.

25 B«I.S. Ralei®h, "mddle East Politics—Past Ten Years," Middle
^eten^ Affairs. January 1959, p. &.
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it tNi pmitim of tite tinited States m Palestine"^ and Anexiean st^oit
to Bzitialt poiiey in^ pzesent Angle-igYptian o^flict caused

eoun-

try to irajoet tite {s^osal* fhe Eg^n^tian goi^rnnant insisted en the inned*
iate and tmoi^itiofMil witiidxanal of all British taroeps free the Canal Zone
isefose it ««ild even o^idar enterii^ a paot with the Wast* UNt planliad
to be held in abe^^noe**^
*

Prior

*

•

the Seoond World lar, the Soviet tftiion did little to z^dnd

tiie EgYptiai» of its existenoe. This» hi»«everf dees net aean that the Sov
iet iMim did not ai^reoiate tlM» iUaportaneo of the strategic positii^ of
Egypt and l^e Az^b w^ld to tiie set^rity of its territory. In 1^6, tiie
Soviet Itoiwi sent a Itesl^ delegation to the All*Mi^leK C(8)gress in Itecea
28

ai^ s^itfted King tim Sai^ in his olaia to tiie Calipha^*

Bie nea«ure

was directed against King f^*ad of Egyptf vlio also mnted to prc^late hii^
self the Cal^ of Islaa* Ihe Swiet acticn was i^tivated by the
^itii^ policy of the govertamfit in Cairo*
this Wis c^^idored ^e only Russian activity in the Mi^le East until
otttil^Piak of World lar 11* As fox tlw activities of le^l Egyptian Ceononists* tbeir first ai^aa»nee was in 1919. The Cenninist group ceased to
exist thJEoe years la'tor* because of its atteqst to revolutiwiize -^e

^ Rallrfi l^mdhot Intx<^ctien to 2e Hear Bast wad ttte Great Powers*
edited by Richard N* Frye* (Caii^ri(i^e» Mass.t HarvaxiHEiiwrsity Press»
mi), p. 1.
^ Paul U Hanna, "Aaerica in tt» Middle East," Middle eastern
AffiiaFS. May 1959, p. 182.
^ Moahe I«sh«a» ^Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East," Middle
Eastorn Affairs* January, 1953, pp. I-IO*

g$v»s%we{it as well as political, soeial» and irtligi<»ts instityitions «ndi
traditions in

eouiitry. Beeause of l^so intandod radial ohangcs* ttot

Egyptian gowemnsftt stq:^x«ssod thai? aetivitios* Quiring tiw 1930*8 tJNi
C(»n!Hiist party

its aetivitias» lAit

it itsad tbe Birq^an C@»f

fflunist parties• taeties of infilferatiiig th» natiofial Ibr^ts. ttea ifyptlai}
Coanunists nem cooperated with tte aitti-eoionial natiofialist aevmwnt* 11m»
eBdrg0iiee of a strong workins elesa <^ring

vmt slseng^ened the Ctmtiii-

ists* position. The isffledtste post-wsr era edtti

aRti*ie#t feelings

in Egypt gave the CawKinists a n&n powsr.^^ this power, hfiwev«r» vias
eclipsed as a result of Itossian support in the Ursited Maticms of the estahlishflient of ii» Israeli state.
Diplc^tic relations were established belaioen Mosctm and Cairo fat
first tJjfta in 1946. Ihis iisas followed by the elation of an Ambio pvvgtm
by radio Moscow. During the Anglo-Egyptian tensim over t4»

Bsse in

l^,Soviet pr<^aganda advocated the Bg^^tian eause. Sreat Britain was
severely attacked for its att^ts to illegtit^ately waintain her eecM^tion
of Egyptian soil. Badio Moscow intsnsifiod its attacks against the Westexm
bloc in gasieral vrftan Egypt ma prassnted

^ pr^^s^l tf ereating a

Mi^^ East Taraaty C^anization. Turkey was aeoised of tr^^ng through this
seheme to revive

Ottonan Eapiani at the eiqpense of ^ Arab sovereignty.

Turkey also ms called the bridgehead f^ iUaeriean ii^rialism in the Middle
Bast. Bven Israel, whieh had reeeit^d so iKich support from the C^minlst
bloc sines its creation, was called an agent of Amsrican ir^rialls®. This
was an obvious attempt t© arcsisa antl-A«erictn sentia^nts among the Arab

29 y^slter Laqjuer, "The Appeal of CoasEiunis® in the Middle Hast," The
Middle East Journal. Winter, 19S5, pp. 17-27.

17
pe<^le. The Moscow n<iio» Mhilo pointing to Ai^lovAmriean rivalry in «t<»
t«npting to ^eupy «nd oig^loit Ou) regiwi, nentievM»d Hat both cflMRtries
Hers pisnsning a unifiod policy in tryii^ to suqpproao luitiwul aspintiens
tmxag

po^lo.^

Lashes,|g« cit> See also, Le«mid 1. Strakhoirslcy, "The Kature of
Soviet Propaganda in the Kear East," |h£ Hear Bast and the Great Powers.
edited by Riehard N. Frye (Cai^rid^e, Ks.t Hirvaxdiy^rsity Preast
1951), pp. 65»9.

CHAPTER II
FROM MMM TO NASSER

The July 23» 1^2 moveaent 9f ^ Sgyptlsn ai»y achiti^<d weh sueeess*
The speed

nhlch the amy wes abjye to ovestiirew -^le gmmxnmntp seia»

the eeuntry» and feret the abdieatlen o# the King aattj^d way peeple in and
caitside

Egypt, Memrnx, to lh®se «li® were well amre ©f ^ iweiits that

to«^ pl3«e in the Efi^tian peiitieal i^ater during taii fmxt v»tT$ priwt t©
the 1^2 €OCTEi d'etat, the matter i«i»ild sew rather 8lif>ie« ^peated fail
ures In political ccmfliets «d.th Gmat Britain intensified the dissatisfaetien ef tt^ msses «d^ tl^ rulers* These xtilers wxe aeeu^d ef eellabe*
rating with j^itish i^riali^ in or^r td aaintain their positions and to
exploit the people. The disastrous defeat in -^e Palestine vi«r eoni^ised
the fflinds of the i^^le af»l the asny*^ The defeetive smi vdth viiieh the
ansfy was sullied te fi^ht Urn Jewish state

mro revealed to Urn public*

Many BgyptljRs believed that Urn Palac« was directly csfus^eted idth purehas*
ing these iB|>erfeet »xm*

The six n^ths titot pre<%»ded the llevelutien» as

we have seen*^ was an alo^t diaetie juried* ^reading strikes* violent
street

ai^ ths existence ef indecisive qmrntmrnt^ effeiNid

str<sng ppe€»f of the iailif^s of tiie existing regliae. It was generally believed that the "Ainy was

only nati^l insti*

^tiim in B|^t t^t csuld provide law and ®rder« tnd ^ «Kiiy dymade ele«
laent in a disrupted %yptian sta^ that could assum #ie tiiie ef politi««l
arbiter.*^
^Mireal Coloi^t "igwt turn #ie Fall of i^reuk to the ^Itermry 1994
Crisis-, i^le Eastern Affairs. JNaie, IfW. p. m»
^ Sttgta. p. 8-9.
^ P.J. Vatikiotis, JM Sgyptian Aim in Pelitics (Blooeilngtoni
Indiana Wiiversity Press, l%i)» p. 71.
18
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Takli^ tlwix' cue

ttm son» statWMiits by &u»il Abdul Htefts#? tliat th*

rolft after the sueeess of

eeup d'etat was <mly te be *iit^

fr^t for a few bcRirs***^ nest Wtstens edmesKNirs eonsldered i^t the sieve*
sent ef J^ly 2^ did mt have a dbtaiied pl«i te be eanittd eut
Here is hmi em #f tiiese Observers destribed

stafes*

general sentloefit ef the

Free Officers iJH^diately after lite sueeess ef ^eir rev^ltt
Wiat is ^rtein is tiiat they were {»atrie<Ni am
ef geed will* anlaated by «Ni desire to
geed
ar^ fm ^welfare ef
eennlxy* But 8«mii
Hiey were Hm4 ndlth diffioilties irtii^ eeaviaeed
tiiett that best intesitiMis a^
will mm mt
en«i9h te save Egypt free N»r pr^letts*"
The abe«« au^er believes ^at it is unkiiewEi vifeether the cew& d'etat was
oiie of

^in 0f events lliat kept -Hw eeuntry in tyoirail sim&e Werld Mir

II or if it was meant to be a revelutiffin* Huit is eertain is that tiM sm^
ceeding events ef ^e first few

pz^srrad that a real rei^lytien was

in the pr^ess in Egi^t* "New it is plain that a new pe>litieal force has
taken eentrel ef Sgypt# a foar^ which represents a fresh podat #f view and
pregras of drastic change."^
EMring the first two h^^s of its existef^e» i0m new regiflw shewed
little tmmm with intesmatiwial affairs. It cwicentratid B»t ef its ef*
forte en t)M solution of Bgfypt's denestic pn^leott* (^at efi^Krt was Made
to eonsolidate the ruling xegiee by i^trging its ae^l «r po^n^l
Gppi^nts.

4 6a!i»l Abdul Hasser,^
Sl M&
(Buffaloi
Keyiwe and Marshall Publisherst 19&9), p. 32. lihe book was first piblished
in Arabic in CaiaK>» 1^«

^ COLAAAJO, SSL" SLS*» P*
^ Joim S. ^ideally "ifeere is Egi^t Going?" Fwreign Foliev Bulletin.
NoveiBber 15, 1952. p. 1.
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In tha field of foreign ralations, it ms evident that tha military
regies m$ pro-ftostern and anti-Russian. Th« amy's crackdwMi ©n local
Coij«jkni3ts wittiin tk# first few sseeks of tha revolution strongly supports
ta0 anti-Cosmmist teiK^sncies of the new region. On August 12, 1^2, tjie
leftist labor unions in Kafrud Damr, a textile industrial center, staged
a d®fflonstration shouting "long livt the Aray's Revolution."^ Folic® and
aM»y troqas bittled sith th® rioters, killad nine of them and vsj«mded aany
othier$. General Blaguib co«d@fliied th« event, branding it as "Cwasmiatinspired stritet.**^ Leigh '»'3iite, in supporting this b«ll#f (the mw
pro-lssterii attitud#s)> has statedi
Th» Pme Officer's tnti-Coawunist trend is I^yorrf
any dcMbt.«..Th®y s«»ild be @vsn aora antl-Riissisn
and px&^AmrlemB I tiiink, if the U.S. would be
less cautious iimn it has been in assisting tiaguib
tad ^Junta te attain l^ir i^dest ee^oaic and
p«litieal objectives.^
After 8 auceeseftil att»i^t to sestore tranquiility to tiie naticm dur*in^ the first tmo n<»iths of the Itevolation, General Kaguib began to seek
solutims to the tiiomy px^leai ef AnfIo*%yptian selati^ans* Early in
Oe1»^r

l^ie tsf© govemraents C|>en»d negotiations on ttie futtire of the

S«^n. General Ntfuib, and his representative in the ^idan "handled ti*e
IA
sitaiatian teteirably well."
The old Eg^tian practice of not c««iceding
^ right of »elf«deter»lnatlon to the Sudan was abandorwd.

Keitfe lii|»«ldck» liaaMty's Sew Eg^t (New Yorki Frederick A. Praegar,
Ptiblisher, I960), p. 14.
®

P»

^ *The Blessed Revolutltjn*, Harpers. Jamiary, 1953, p. 87.
Itekki Shibeika» Thg Indtmeradten^ ^adan (New Ywki Rdfe»rt Seller
& Sons, 1969), p. 4^«
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Hw mw §«mmmnt i»99tiatwl uttii

1$m s^fmrntiaU (ihwa wb#

m indtepai^tnt Sudan) and ^ mlanists
of an %i^tlafK^Miiiaaca
mnts of

mdm)

pattlaa* Bi 1i« past^ §mmm»

t» ia»3.iida
IN» tetttta ef liia

wltd mm to fovaar

sapaxatitta IJI any M)t9tiati<M

and teeanda^ ^mi at BadLtiah lapatialiat

st<H»@aa. Itatft @afMi«it lii^uib*$ ^ffme ta dis«isa tlia is«ia

mm

a powasirfiUl

tha mpmt?*

ta Bgypt pzaatliKi

ttm-

all pellti'eal faettens in fly> ^iiiii*
Tha fia9^iati«ma

l^taSn asuiad wi^ a hiat^ic avant, Hm sifii«

ing af aa af»mn»iit

9ml§*4f^WBSmiAJm tm ^a ^idaii m MmmtY

12» 1^. the fallcmliii la a i^ntaxy af ^ntn pravlai^M ef this agtaa*
nantf
Cl) m aairly a^etia» fiir an aU sMinaM Paxlia*
aiaitti a^«vii«d hf a ntieM il»ctenl CoMdsalm
of Mwan imRlwxa (Haern Sydamsa^ ana
m» %yptiaii| ana
wmAt aa a
ehainMHi an IMljui)! \2) a tamnaltiaiMl pariad of
i^ll »alf<-fCM«»MB(Kit $f iMt «a»a tibiaii ^tnaa yaarst
in flKdar td MiaJbJto tlea Sadtamsa paopla ^ asearctlse
Idiaiir aalf*dataxadmtiaQ Sn a tew ai^ iMittzal
(S) a i^pae&al a«i«git^a
taaplaia
^"Sudaniaatian* af tha /MWbtiatzatiany W»
^iea#^S^n OafaiiM ^»6a« alNs«t «itii|n ^
1^a*i^a« paariadf (4)alaetian af a CenatiHiaiit
Aatai^ly ^ da«i<te
il^ttaw ataiNa ef 1^
and ^ p»^fa a aanatitutiaiit (§) > da«iaieii «n
tih« ftttiara af tNi Sa^a Ca) liy #ia Canatitiiaat
Aaaaiybly
liidc ilia S««ten wi^ Sgfi^t in
any ftmt air Cb) by^ C«ia|itiaant Asawably
iMig aenptota locikg|>aiKianiM«^
Badtls}! Fraraign Saexataxy

Edan eautionad tlia Haitsa af CarawMns

m Hio day tha agxeMent waa alfn^t daalaxlfifi "I Must aa|p^asi2a*»«.that
Ibid., p» 489,
«0tvalapiieBt of
"Oiwilapcgant
o U.S. PaUay in tha mddla &tt," U.S. Stata Dapartaant Sullatlii> Fabasuaxy 22, i«4» pp. 280-1.
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l^is is not an binary instanee of a dependent toraritozy proesedii^ towjrd
soIf-0ovemBient«*«*The]« axo mny eoqplieaticms axisingf frm tha pa^liar
stalsis of the atdan as a Cmdiminiun**'^^ It is intexest^ to contrast
t^is statement with ^ mm iptlnistie view of

U.S. Seeretiry of State

Ji^R Fo$1»r Dulles* vino believed that the British, tiut Egyptian* and ths
^danese pestles sbmild view tlie settlement '*wi^ e^l satisfaetion as
ai^r^riate to their respective inl^Msts* aiKi as providing a solid foundati^ for friendly* outually benefieial i^tore relationships."^^
It is eomnanient at this point to trace briefly ^ subsecpent history
of tlui relations between Bg^t and tl» Sudan. In the mttxm of 1^ a
general election wis held in ^e ^an «Mch resulted in a victosy fw the
ashikk*a (BrotJ^er8 Alliance)* mito canpaigned for union witi> ^ypt. Isns*il
al-as^ri* tl» leader of the a^ikk'a. took office as ^e Priro Minister.
this was c^idered a setback to the pro-British IftacM (Pet^le's) Party#
However* al-Azhari radically changed his pro-Egyptian policy *fcen the cwflict between Naguib and Nasser resulted in the expulsion of Haguib freei
15
his positlm as tiie PriisB Minister as k«11 as the President of Egypt.
From Idiis tiae on, the ajtdan follo^sed an indopendent policy in its relati(»is witii her neighbor on the Nile.
Next t® l^e Sudanese q^iestitm came the thomy problen of ^Itish
As quoted in J.C. Ikirewits, "Britain, Egvpt, and the Sudan,"
Foreign Policy ailletin. March 15, 1953, p. 1.
"EWelc^paaent of U.S. Policy in -ttia Middle East," U.S. State
Deoartaent Bulletiit* February 22, 1^,
280-1.
The ^danese tkveleped great affectitxi for General Naguib lor two
reasonst (1) his unprecedented move to grant then Om right of selfdeterminaticu), and* (2) Haguib was bom to a Sudanese nother and lived his
chil<fiiood in the Sudan. P.J. Vatlkiotis,
c|;|»* p* 92.
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irva<0i«tlaR tsm

Canal

Zmm, BmHxs

^dsn agx^eeant was slgnei*

Celiiiel llh(a»B3r» tlM «ie««)d 9txm§mt aan in the military zefiae,
eUat
ttmsfys

it

%^t weaXd denaiKi tiie wie^itiemal eiraiei»tieii @f fereifn
tier 8#ii* He stc^#^ Wnls via* t® a Briti^ eoxirespofKientt

YCNI elaim tluit y^ms acrny in ^ OAIML Zene is ^ERE
t© k»i^^ atissians out. I tell ym its presence
is the greatest eingrle i^staele to ^e defense ef
the MicMle Hast# ^ hate the British occij^ticm
andty if ymi don't f# «dUir^Jly» m shall li^ht****
ISe shall nst sifo any Defense Pact as s €<mdition
®f yeiir fein§* Yew Mtst §o**®
With this deter»i«ati®rj the Egyptian Qoverraffisnt epened negetiaticms
witfc the ^ited Kingdoa ®n the Canal Zcme in Cairo on Aparil 27, 1^. A
quielc ^ttleaent of^ issue ms hindered by the disagreement betmen the
tm {iNirties as to liiel^r the Sudan would be free to choose ssisbership in
tiM British 0«n^iiiweaith*
C0l«iMil Kasser pahlicly stated the Egi^tian position In a press inter*
view two weeks before tibe negotiations began. He pointed cut that Egfypt
was willing to maintain the Smz Base, and tl^t since Egypt by itself m$
unable td prwide

neeessary technicians, it ms willing to allow Bri

tish f«rs®nii«i to take tiie responsibility of providing technical aid fooe
^ Mkia^nanee of tiie base. Kasser, however, ®ade it clear titat this
^«ild ii9t be intex|>reted by the British govesmsient as a veiled occupatiasi.
Ife tlwwa reiterated his previews deelarati^ts tJist Hgypt would not join a
17
ctofense treaty with the Wfest as a price for the evacuation.*
Tlie two delegaticms cor^ueted extensive negotiations, but disagreeioents arose over the numl»&r of Sritish technicians to be isainfeined in the
21s las Stataanan and Hatia^. Jamiary 17, l^.
2a JJSI

Tiae«. April 13, 1953, p. 6.
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Gtml

ittogth @1 tia* 1m «hleh tsehnieal aid w^ld be nee^d,

and British inslst^ocie m its right te re^nt^r tite Zem in tise of mt*
Egfpt b]^« off ti» ntgetiati^a ®aly ten ^y« after tliey had started.^®
Hotisver, eentaets betwe«n Cairo and Ixmdm o^icemlng the Canal Zm»
prebl^ Mere renewed m ^ly 30, iS@3.

Joint e«minicp» issDwd at l^e

cutset of ti)e e^f^mrsatiiKts s^ted ^at

possibllitiee of agreement

will be fear-UM»r ei^lsared by ^is mians before diec»i8si<ms are resided*
No cona^'te deeisioas were agreed iq^on* and m September 4, tiw British
dblegation left f&t

after holding six aeetinga vWi the Sg^ti«R

gever»ent<
^rther negotiations were «leadl^i^ until Jhjly 11, 1^, On l^is
data, a British <itele0atii»i rei^f»d dlseussion with tite Egyptian au1^@ri»
ties m the fixture ©f the Smz Bum*

On July 27 an aiceord entitled 'Tfiea^

&f Agreeiient* wes reaohedf it provldkid f&t the vdthdraval of 83,W British
tro^s froB the Sims Imm ndthin tmenty n^thsi

base «fas to be iiaiao

tained by tine Egyptian go^^maeat wll^ the assistai^ of 4,CKK) British
teehnieiana Hearing eivllian elo^sj a«kd, in Om evwnt of an attaek
any s^aatKry to iBie A»»b CoUeeti^w Seeurlty Pact or iipce 1\irkey, British
troips would have ^e right to pit

Suez Base under tlieir disposal.

^Itain and Egypt waived all fimoioial elains m eaeh o^r arising froa
the previous British oeoupatlon* Ihe 1^6 tmaty was abrogated by (3z«at
Britain (Bg^^t had already abrogated It in 1951)• Finally bo^Ui parties
affilled ^Ir deten^natioa *to uqphold ^e 13@8 C©nstantineple C^ventiim

*8y 7, 1^,p. I.
E»«t ImmmU ^ronology,- Atttaan 1953, pp. 507-8.

in ^o $mz Cwi*!.*^

pwxftnttolng ftMden of
in

'ttie aeoosNl ms x>e3««lted 1^ sen* wiib siwptieitti* 1h« Brit*

ish gcwofiaMat Justified it im tlM» gx>oini(li i^t tlit ew(»»iti<^ of British
tr^s free SsftPti*^ toi^it<^ wie i«»tivstt<i by^^sif« to mintsin firiond*
Uor imlations
aadit

Ggy|>t in the frnmn simI i^t adwii^td adliitoiy

Canal iaso less lap^etant

bof^*^^

In Oiirot tlM %yptian govsn»wint hailod
ally liboi^ittd

agiraesiont fm haviaf fin*

soil froe **|a|)Orialis»'**

in ignn^t i^mk ia Btitain m tho prei:^siti«fi iliat
isottar tolati«ii8 Imtmm

iwts loss ffim^sis
a§tooiMmt vnstilti l^in^

two nati^as. Missor aanoiBioed to a huge sally

in Caiiro that *'CiM stafo of our s^eugglo \a» oi»ted and a now stafo is ab«»it
to Nfin»"22

«

»

«

tho eoiifliet h»lmm Goiwral Haguib and ColOMil l^si»t, liiioh xoaohod
its i^ak In early 1^» goes book to 19!^.

Free Offloors pii^d Hagaib

IMd.. mimtk 19@4, p. 4IN3. the Cimstantiai^lo C<MiiNHiti«i»
was signed (m Oeteber
li^ by Britaint @osmny, ^triaoHyingiaryt %ain»
ftanoe* Italy*^li^tiborlaiids, %ssia and iroxlny» eo^posed of sovsntoon
artiolos dealing wiHh t«iiiilati^s
insiuo ^ free use of ^ Bmt Canal
for inteimatiiMial navigation^ Tho oen'^aeting partiss agreed n«^ in any my
in^rfexo tiie
frte use of
Oinal» in tint of mr as in tim of
poaoe*" Aooflotding to Artiele 9 of the Cemmntliny
ms iMthorised to
*tafai
ne^ssary aoaimres fme ibisui^ the emcwticm of the treaty."
Artiole 10 granted Bgwt tSio right to 4iim^ passage thr««^^Canal to
any country at mr nd'tii
in order to soi»ire "the defense of Igypt and
the miatenanoe of f^lie order.* See ©ovomaent of igypt, tMte Paper jtg
Sa Wtti^liration $i^m»M Marltlwo Canal CoiPany W^tro ^jwomaent
f>ress» 1956)t
^ M iitnchostor ©uairdian Wwkly. August 9, 1984.
22

IE. fit.* p. 197.
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fe;

jUNidtxshlp beeausa of his i^apitatloR as an hm&st ganttal and his

high t9iA» m»mw nms tiiea tiit ma^lmT of^ammmntf aiMi h* hioBsif
mado the plan fox* iMiloeting the fonotal* «9M»n Hie Revolutlm
Kaguib held tlie Ism highest titles to Wgfp^^PtmsiMnt and Pxiaie Minister*
ilMt Hasstr was esoareising eon^l emw the activities of^f@we»»atnt
thmi^h

^olutionary CunniMi Council C^)* ttm IOC was fomed ianed-

lately after the viiei^ss of

Rewelution and ms ooqdrised of eleven Free

Offieers plus @emral Hagiiih. *1^ flSCC was
emEBent* Mijor govorment deeisi^ had

real power behind the gov*
he passed hy i^Jwity vota of

its aeaiters* Al-^oti^ih Kni^ih possessed i3v» top p^emition in tlM> gove»»ant»
he was Ixit^ of the Ms^rs of

ROC tdth a stogie vote.

(Seneral f^uib,^jian whoa tiw Free Officers wanted to he tlie figure*
head of^ Hevolutienary xegIUM, hoeaae Ijmensely pqpiilar

Egin^tian

iaasses. In Oetoher 1^ Ifesser and his assooia^s appoto^ tiir«e new
iMlnisters to the Cajbinet wi^o»t c»istilting ^Gofwral.^ Ni^ih prot^s*
tod tlw aotim* Qmfident of his ovor»ridtog value to the r^toe* Wtquih
^sianM

tmm autiiority to 4imtt tM affai:ini of ^ stat^ tiian ms dele*

gated to hia hy tho BQC. He requested a veto p^r owsr aetii^s of tdie ^
rattier tiban his sii^le irate* Hfeen these d^nds «ie»i not laat he resigned
m Felsraary 29« 19&4. liiA rosignati^ was aoo^tid» ai^ Col^l Hasser*
**tlMi ^ief architect of the Revoluti^ an^ the d^dnant persc^lity to ^e
nx, and tho Ban nost cleai^eadsdly devoted to #iat he has called
dreaa of an %ypt free and str^,* heeaae leader to

mm as he had 1^

been to fact***^ Nasser* ^s» ascended to the prmiiorship wil^ the
^ J««ohlA J<»sten» Hasser. the Rise to Pmmst (Lw^iont tong Acre,
1960), pp. 102-3.
^ Ri#iard Holte, "Egypt to Twnsitim," Foreign Policy Bulletto.
July 15, 1954, pp. 1-2.
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pi^sideney JDsmining ^^nt*
The g«v»raEffi»nt*s sfUMiunecNBent tkit liaguib tMs$ dismissed beeause he
sought <iie^t®xiai power did not satisfy

masses in Cairo* Naguib MS

hailed as a Biartyr« and si»e«i^ students and the pe^le d^nsruded Hmt
^ir bel«(ved lea<lter be reinstated to t^e presidency. Sinilar h(»(tility te
lesser Mas deaenst»ited by the ^danase pe^le* Even the axisy urns split
witfn tm large fa«ti^ deaai«iing ttie return of Naguib#
Cenfrcmted with tliis ©ritieal sitwatie®, Kasser consented to the retiHm ©f Ma^ibf four weeks after the letter's resignatien. Naguifo again
beeaae ttw l^sident» the Prine Hinistar* and t^ Chairian of
Capitalizing on his pepularity* he announced ttve emi of

ROC*

transition per

iod arwi that Ig^t ms ready for parliaoentary life* The press started its
eaapaign for civil liberties, ai^ Naguib proaised to meet its dewnds.^
Behind the scenes* Masser was vigerwisly «^ing to consolidate his
position

^e areiy* the police* ami the tradte tini^. He obtained new

s«^ort

sosie elements t#io feared that ^iguib's appeal to the peqple,

would make hia the captive of extrem wafveronts. Ittese el^>nts were also
worried that Naguib*a latest »®ws were dtesigtied to i»instate ttie old aregi«e*27 Qrj April 15, l^, Naguib m$ once ®ore es^lled, now for good,
and ]^t un<fer hmse ariest. Masser retailed his previews positiw as the
PriJEBe Minis'ter, and, in effect, ruler of Egypt*

2S Ibid*
^ BE
Hast J«imal. %ring 1964, p. 186| see also P.J.
Vatikiotis, Ofg. s||.# p» 91*
27 Ibid*

CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND
W THE EGYPTIAN-CGIIWNIST ARHS DEAL
The change of Adteinistraticm in lashii^ton in for«ight

witi^ it a

new approach to the United States* peliey tcmard tiie Middle East. The
TiniBsan Adffiinistratlsn believed that liie Suez Zmm had te be maintained by

^e Western Powers if an effective ctefense for the Middle East ms desired.
F©r this reas^ tdie United States State Departaent had almys supported
London's posititm that British troqps w^ld net evacuate unless %ypt would
bectMse a member ©f a Astern sp^isored security pact in -Wie Middle East.^
John Foster Dulles, tiie author of the r^w approach, twjred the Middle
East in the sprii^ of 1^ in order to get a direct view of the situati^
in the area.^ He devised the "Northern Tier" concept to coe^nsate for the
ir^vitable surremier of the Canal Base to i^^t. Hie new Secretary of State
was convinced that Cairo «^ld never entertain the idea of joining an ex
clusively Western alliance as a price for British evacuatitm. The Northern
Tier concept wras a shift of ea^jhasis simi a Suez Base-centered defense sys
tem to a defense system of ccmtainment of probable S^iet ejqpansion in the

Middle East by grouping Middle Eastern states in a Western oriented
alliance.^ The countries within this area were Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and
Pakistan. After he reached Washington from his Middle Eastern tour, Dulles
reportedi

^ Keith Stieelock,|£. cit., p. 2CB.
2 Ibid., p. 214.
3 J.s. Raleigh, "The Blast and ttie Defense of the Middle East,"
Middle Eastern Affairs. June-July 1955, p. 177.
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A Middle East Defense Qcganization is a fytsirs
rather tiian an iamediate possibility* Many of the Arab
countries are so ei^rossed with their cparrels ^at ^y
pay little heed to ttie meoaoe of Soviet Csomnism.
Howaver, there is aore concern »^ere the Soviet IMon is
near. In general, the "Sorthem Tier" of naticms shows
av«areness of ^is dai^er.
Tt«(re is a vague desire t© hav® a collective security
system. But no such sys^n can be ioposed fxm wi'^out.
It should be designed and grow from Kdtiiin out of a sense
of cofinaon destiny and
dai^er. 'lOiile aviaiting the
foxtaal creation,
United States can usefully help
strengthen ^ interrela^d defense of t^ose ccmntries
wiiieh urant sti»ir^th> not as against each otoer or the
Ws$t» but to xesist the coisson threat to all free pe^les.
During his Middle Eas1»m tour« Secretary Dulles understood that Iraq
would be t^ie only Arab country to be Initially included in ttie alliance*
HffiNsver, the United States wcHild pursue its encwrageTOnt to other Arab
states to Join it.
Proceedit^ witJi the plan thus conceived, the T\irkish-Pakistani Pact—
the cornerstone for the aore cooparehensive alliance—mas cc^ieluded in
Jaraiary 1954.^ Tluis Washii^ton has succeeded in laying the base fm the
Northern Tier. The toited States reacted by providing aassive military and
economic aid to the two C(»mtries. In Iraq and Iran official stateiaents
ware issued welcoming the tww alliance* In Syria> altiimigh

govenuaent

welconed the accord betmen Turkey and Pakistan, it cautioned li^at tiie Pact
«»s a non-Arab one and tiiat the Arab states should refrain fro® takii^ any
decision until the questic^ of Arab participation vas discussed in tiie Arab
League Council*

va^en the question of Arab sta'tes* participation w®s dis

cussed in the Council, laost metier states ei^ressed (^position, a
^

Depaftoent of State ^lletln> June 5, 1953, p. 835.

^ Jules Davids, "The U.S* and the Middle East,** Middle Eastern Affairs.
May 1961, p. 130*
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resolution ms adopted declaring t^t the Arab states **w«ild not aeeept any
resptmsibility undarmining ttieir sovereignty and imtependince, or inet^ipatible witt\ tl-i©ir rasponsibilities as asmt^rs of the Arab League.*^ The
resolution vies coasidared a defsat for the pro-Hestem gofverraaent of f^ri
es-Said of Iraq vthich favored Arab participation in the m\n Fact.
Arab objection to joining toe Turkish-Pakistani Pact—for t^iat letter,
any systean of alliance witii the stest—v«8 laainly instigated by Egypt*
(It my be i^called that as early as 1^1 Cairo rejected any military as
sociation with the 5^81.)^ The new Egyptian regin® regarded any jsove by an
Arab state to seek meobersh^ in the new Fact a defection from the Arab
solidarity and the Collective Security of the League. Egypt was also isKjrried ^t unless t^e Arab ««}rld solidly supported her stand for unccmdi*
ti<mal withdfawal of the ^itish frt»i the Canal Ims, her bargaining power
in negotiatir^ a satisfactory settlemnt of ^is <pestion wc»ild be aayeh
weakei^d.^
Until the signii^ of the Suez Agree^nt in July 1^, Dulles had
achieved sctcie suceess in cc^incing ti^ Bgyptian authorities tiiat the net;
AdBBinistration in Washit^ttm had chained her policy to one »ore favorable
toward the Arab world. EXirii^ his visit to Egypt in the spring of 1953,
IXilles prfflBised the Bgvptian goverm^nt ttnat the Uni-ted States wwld per
suade Great Britain to evacuate the Zone within a short period of tin^. On
July 15, l^. President Eisertfjower declared •Oiat tiie United States would

^ The New York Tl^s, April 2, 1^, p. 1.
See page 15
S M, Pertoan, "The Turkish-Zirab Diplaiaatic Tangle," Middle eastern
Affairs, January 1955, pp. 13-17.
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make "fii® cfflamit-bMnts" to Egypt with re§a3?d to military and econffiaic
assistance if Nasser would arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the
British.^ '#ien the Agreeiaent ««s signed between Britain and Bg^t, the
Aaexican goveaewaent expressed its gratification and hoped for better rela
tions with Sgypt.
In %spt as well as in tiie O'Uier Arab states, a hqpe developed that the
Eisettfiower AcSainistration «Ki«ild inaugurate a new American policy c<s«cem»
ii^ Ute Arab-Israeli conflict, a policy inhlch wi»tld pay due regard to Arab
interests awd be charael^rized by "s^athetic and friendly impartiality."10
The Arabs h<^ed for scae redress of »^at they »>garded as past injustices.
ajt from the Arab viesipolnt, little, if any, of these h^s material
ized. Stiile the United States ms persuading Britain to evacuate her
troths froffl ttie i^yptian soil, Dulles cowJucted certain activities that
were considered as working against %ypt's anbiticms. The encwiragemnt by
Dulles for Iraq's enterii^into a defense treaty with l\irkey was a move in
apparent conflict with the non-CMfflittaeBt policy advocated by Nasser.
Itien Iraq did sign the Baghdad Pact vd.tti Turkey in February 1^, and later
s®s joined by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran, Egypt ms furious.^^
With respect to tite Arab-Jewish ccMnfllct, Egypt believed that the
Elsenhovser Administration did not change the prevlmis Admlnistratl<m*s proIsraeli policy In the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel remained Washlr^t<m*s
^

New York Times. July 15, 1^, p. 1.
"(^ir Stake In the Middle East," Current History. Nowober 1^7, p.285.

il Harry B. Ellis, Challeni;3e to
Middle East - ConaMnlst Influence
and Afflerican Policy (New Yorki the Ronald Press Company, 1%0), p. 38.
12 R,i,i,A., op. elt.. p. 2£K)| see also Joachim Joesten,

cit..
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"spoiled child" (attiflil wieitellel).^^ Her big share ©f Aaeriean Foreign
aid was not reduced, {Up to 1959, United States govemnent gifts* loans
and grants ammmted to i^arly $500 raillion dollars, ^hile all the Az^b
states c«Bblr»d received less than half this figureX^"^
Althoii^h t^ie United States goveriment signea in Howiaber l^ a $40million econcffiiic agreei^nt with Eg^t t© help

latter devel^ iier

indistrial res<MJtrces, an Egyptian re<pest to pmrehase aodern ams did not
B®et a favorable resp<mse frewi lashlr^ton.^® MeaniAliile Israel was con<feicting regular raids on Arab villages. Se^ral Israeli attacks on Eg^tian
ailitary posts, especially tt\e raid in Gaza on Feh«iary 28, 1955, were
conducted fedth superior military loobility that created fear ©f prospective
Israeli e^q^ansionist aias.^^
The consecpences @f all of tihese events—namly, the establishment of

the Baghdad Pact, the uns<^athetie Aaerican policy temrd the Arabs in

^ The term was pt^ularly used by the Arabs.
14 See footnote 25 on pageM •
Harry B. Ellis, tsp, cit.,

40-2.

Fayes A. Sayegh, 1||e Arab-Is^ell Cwiflict (ifew Yorkj The Arab
Infoifltation Center 1^),
71-3. It vK»2ld seem appropriate here to
state that sc^ae l^stem authors accused Nasser of being responsible for
creating tiie tense situatic^ between the Arab states, especially ^ypt,
and Israel. Joachia Joesten presented ^is viewpoint as folloi^J
Coniando raids contacted at night on Israeli villages had
started in the spring of 1955 frees the (^za Strip, the slice
of desert v^ich had nmined in Egyptian possession after the
armistice in 1949. Sexm, the raids were being conducted from
Syrian and Jordanian territory as well. The nightly assaults
cm the civil p^ulation of Israel were i^tehed by daily broad
casts from Cairo radio in wdiieh Egypt premised to grind Israel
to <fcist.
See IB. s||., p. 153.

tijelr eonfllct with Israel* and the withheldir^ by the iestezti bloc of aims
shipient to Egypt—siere imaediate simJ fax-areachiiig. Eg^t's powerful pr^aganda aachin# started beaming out "anti'-ifflparialist" slogans designed to
make Arab pec^les thri^hout the Middle East ej^ose Aaariean policies towsard
the area* Nasser found iafflediata respcmse froia -aie Arab nasses wfto eonsid*
ered him an Arab rat^r tiian oerely an Bg^tian lea^r.^^
*

*

*

Ismediately after ttte Gaza raid of February l^, Nasser intensified
his apfieals to the Aaerican governoent to provide his ar®y with military
equipEKRt. He »®nted first the purchase of SICK) million worth of artts» but
^en he fcHjiui no response he x^duced his order to $20 million worth of
Atuerican weap<M»s.^® His efforts

again ended with failure* Harry B.

Ellis described ^^e epis^ this myi
The American Embassy in Cairo* realizii^ tiiat the a«^nt
of arms vniiich could be b^ht for titls swi (J20 million^
would not ei^ble the Egyptian Army to defeat Israel,
strongly favored idie arsas sale. The ^ibassy was ctmvinced
that Nasser wanted the arms primarily to isaprove the morale
of his tro^s and to counter growing unrest in the Army*
Negotiations dragged on ^rmigh the spring and sua^r of
19S3* Nei^er Nasser nor AggJl^assaddr Byroade ce^ld obtain a
definite answer frora ^shingten.
In July Byroade nade a final a{:^eal to the Departoent of
State, urgii^ that favorable actii^ be taken on the Egyptian
request* He suggested that, shmald ^sser not get ^is
coffiparatively s^ll aoKwnt of arms, he would be forced
either to seek ai»s elsev#iei« or risk the dlsaffecti<m
of his officers. In the end, negotiatiois broke down on
the Binor point of «3iether Cairo vnmld pay for the weapons

Harry B. Ellis, 0£. ci^. p.39.
18 Ibid.,

p. 42.
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in doXXats m Egi^tian pmtnds*^^
iXXis ci^tinuad cm to say t^t «h«n ^ negotiations tndsd, tha Soviat
AedMissadc^ in Cairo effo^d aros to igypt in hugs (pantitias**ai»<mt live
tinss 1^0 aneiint %ypt twanted to p4iip^s«

itm Aaeariea—and "wit^eut edi

tions•** AX^«»^h Nasser did not even infoxai aost of his Cabinet iBeid»«s«
he st»Hi<»ied the Amxiean ^liwssador and toXd hie of

oflev* H^wvtjr*

news of the iHissian oflex Xeaked to the ig^tian amy «nd people who
ed an imnediate aeoeptan^ of the olfe^r*

they oaiM to the

oXusi^ now itiMt the United Statos was favodting IturaeX* and that tiie ius*
sians were sufHPorting the A^b cause* Ntver^Xess* Hssseir stalXed fox tm
wmths before he decided to accept t^e ConMtnist axBs«
Finally* en Septei^y 27, X^» Hisser aimetinced to a hs^ ralXy in
Cairo titat he had esncXttded with Cae^oslofwikia a oassiwi §m»mnts agree*
sent (later ^sser adidtted that Cxei^Mlowakia was a itmt for^ Soviet
tftiitm)*^ It imis a barter afrewMnt Hereby igypt wmiXd pay for the ams
with cotton* %ile t^e contents of the ag»i«Mnt were never revealed to the
public* tinctmfixBed reports stated *the a«i» received wmild reach a total
of about $dO ailliflDt with the individual weapwis priced at a fracti^ of
^Sr real value**^ the fHirchase wml4 include 209 1116 Jet fighterst
1(K) tanks* 6 sufaoMirines* and SOM artillery#^

Ihe Nsstern Powers were shocked at ^is daring and iin|>reee<tented

Xbld.. (ei^shasis added)f see also jl«§. itews and ^CTld Report,
4, im, pp» 48-54.
^ USH &S

Tiaas. Septeirijer 2S, lfS5| and October 26* 1955#

^ SJI Middle Eastern journal. "Chronology*" Winter 1966* p. 65.

^ Mi-
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Sg^tian mm. The Fmeign Minlstsxs el tlw United States» the United
Kii^dw, and France expressed grave ciKneem* U.S. Assistant ^retary of
State George Allen arrived in Calre en Septeji^r 30 in a futile last-miimte
attenpt te dissuade Nasser freei eer^eting the asm deal.^
Israels the emmtry i^st e(NM>e3^d abeut Eg^tian armanent free tiie
Swiet bl©6, retarded the new develqpnent as pesinf a serious ^reat t© her
existence. Pieoier Meshe ^arett protested t© tdie Swiet and Czech gwemwmts against their selling ama to ^ypt. He also asked Urn U.S. State
Beparti»int t© proeilse his cwintry iriiatever arsis reeded to match Bg^t's new
Military strength.^ Siailar notes were delivei^d to the British and French
foreign ninistrles. On Septeidser 29, 19^» Premier ^rret e}q:>ressed to
the Soviet charge d'affaires his nati(6Mfi*8 grave eencem at ^e deal and
reqpies1»d ttie Soviet representative to obtain clarification from his goverraoent of its Middle last policy.^
Israel argued that aiiile her request for svqppiyirg her ax»y with modem
anas was merely for defense |»j^>08e, %^t's intention was for aggressi^.
It seeB»d as thiugh Isj^el's argiment

a convenient rati^ialization, for

Israel was Buch to blane for tite new dev^lii^i^nt. Before Israel be^an her
regular raids of 1%5, Premier Masser was rightly described as a 'Moderate.
His main attenticsn was devoted to secure coi^lete sovereignty for his

^ Mi*
M igw

Times. October 11, 1955, p. 4.

^ Middle Eastern Affairs. "Chrmtoiogy," October 1%5, p. 331.
R.I.I.A.,
cit.. p. 197. Bwn as late as early 1962 Nassar ms
described as having •'never been fanatical abmat the Jews." Kingsley Martin,
"CtmversatiGW with Nasser,** Ihe Hew States«an iSi Natiwii. Jaiuiary 5, 1962,
p. 6.
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country and to etmcentrate on raising tite Eg^tian 9emmiy to a respectable
level.
first Israeli aaiear attack that created fear thr<Mgh^t the Arab
world in 1^ occurred in Felmuiry vftten a regular Israeli artay attacked the
Gaza Strip* killlr^ tSjirty-eifht

The United Nati^is Security

Cmmcil conderaied tills 'prearranged and plamwd attack ordered by Israeli
autiierities*».agait^t Egyptian army forces in Gaza."^ Four »©re Israeli
raids were conducted across

Egyptian truce lines, and on each occasion

substantial losses were inflicted up«m tiw %^tian defenders.^ Hg^t,
lack^ effective i^taliatory raesns* relied upon the paramilitary feda^n
(guerilla f^hters) ^Idi infiltrated Israeli tezritory. ^ile tiie
fedaveen certainly disturbed Israel, their exploits were publicized in tiie
lest far out of prcportion to their actoal dteeds.^®
Coraaander E.H. Hutchison, a seiaber of the Iteited Hations Truce Super
vision OdEiganization in Palestine, described l^e repercussicms of t^e Israeli

3ralds m the Bgyptian political scenes
The Hasser goverraMnt was in a precarious position.
To take nilitary actl^ against Israel tvould be
courting defeat and to take no action would cause
tite goven^nt to lose face, not onlv at horn but
in tiie otiier Arab countries as ws11.^1
Thus Israel could be described as the priiaary elei^nt which brtx^^ht abiHit

27 E.H. Hutchison, Violent Truce (New Yorki Etovin-Adair Co. 1956),
p. 117.
^ United Nations Year Book 1955> p. 33.
29 E.C. Hutchison,
30 Keitii Wheelock,
Og.

p. 119.

cit.« 5^. 111-23.
P» 233.
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the r»w turn of events in the Middle East*
The Bgvptian purchase of C^minist axsts «»s distorbii^ to l^e United
States bit had bro«<ter significance. It was for '^e (Hixpose of pleasing
igVTpt and the Arab world l^t the State Qspartawnt had n^ked so strenumis*
ly to secure the Suez Base agreesent* Dulles had h^d ^at after British
trolls withdrew fro® tl^ Canal Zom Egyptian relations with the Hast wsuld
be greatly inproved and that Preatier Nasser wmild entertain the idea of
Joining a defense pact wi^ ti^ SIsst* The azisis deal with tiie CoBsxmist bloc
served a blow to all of these calculations. For two reasi^s Washington re*
garded the new devel^pnent as a dangerous Russian offensive in t^e Middle
Sast. First* tiie develo^»nt wcxjld give the Swiet ^ion i^Kce influence in
the affairs of the Mi^le East, thus ^e Soviets wmtld realize an age*old
I^ssian dream of securing a doninatir^ position in this sensitive area.
Secondly, providing tiie Bg^tian aimy with huge quantities of nodezn ams
would profkice an arms race between the Arab states and Israel. Thus, ac
cording to Washington belief, peace would then be^extremely hard to naintain in tive Middle East.
Soviet bloc premises to extend a massive military assistance to a nonConaunist c<mntry—%^t—reflected a new aspect of Soviet foreign policy
in the post-Stalin

.^2 xhe Soviets found in the %^ti8n ftfe»ier*s non-

era

aligriaent policy the very objectiim they were persuading the Afro-Asian
countries to adc^^t. The Stalinist regine*s iMre noral support of Eg^t in
her c^flict with Britain ma now changed to material one as well* In
order to challer^e the West in every possible way the ^sslans were *'soft32 Wladyslaw W. i^lski. Peaceful Co-Existence - An Analysis gf Soviet
Foreign Policy (Chicago* Henry Eegnery Company, 1^977 PP* 216-17,

PEDALING"

''Ideology and stressing the wiry ^iing itfiieh ID ^ past

has glwn an aihrantage to ttMi Mssti* i.e.» xeailii^ss to extendi Bilitairy
assistanee to the A^rab emtntfies, whidi ai^ anxiius ixt tiranefont th«ix
patriotic a^ixatims into mality.^
To Bgypt, the Caminist ai»s ^al irepresen^ the iUievitable aove
«iiich would guarantee tivi eoitntx^'s safety against mhat tiie Igi^tians etmsidexed ti^ie es^nsi^st designs &f lsx«el» Pgypt was "{:Miz'ehasin@ aims
81^ not l^ologiess" lor eultuxaUy and ireligiwsly it M»tld be inpenri^s
to Soviet doetrines.^ ^sser was ocmfident tiiat his ecKmtry "ean take a
Red gun v^thi^t any dialeetie weraj^ingst and fly a MX6 plane wltiiout
havii^ to spmit Marx or Lenin."®®

^ ¥era M. Dean, "Struggle for Middle East,* Foreign Policy Bulletin.
Jamiary I, If^, p* 60*
Heal Stanford, "Can U,G. St<^ Hussia in ^e Middle East?" Foreign
Policy Bulletina No!nMi)er 15, 1955, p. 35.

Mi'

Qiknm m
jm C€^0VERSIAL HI@H ASNAif tm
{i8>§ED m-m)
Bi* Hifh Dsn 11^3.4 b* swmt»m tiaes
tlian the ^at
Pyxanids*
im l^oiisaiKis ef
yeefs heine been foreaiest
^
mrmls ef
w^ld, e^feirting
ioaMortility m tlw Hiatoehe*
Qmoil Abdul ^seatl
Bgi^t's uns dtotl witii tiM Ceeminist weirld in SkipteidMjr 19@S» a t^en
Of^ireeedtnted tmm mmm TITO Axab statesi aaretssed SHI^ appxeNmsitsi in ^e
lUnited itates and ^tato* that lieatesn blee ma c^ecxi^ imily ndth the
peesibili^ ef Csamtnist infilt^atiim in if^t tiuren^h tim Seviet blee's
technieal and atilitaxy assistance* As a emsitexmem to the likely e^^iv*
sien ef Swiet inflMnee in Bgypt* the fov«zf»»ats ef l^e United states and
Britain inf^^aatd Bg<^tian f^mBieir Nasser in DeoHiawx 1955, ef ttieiir idlllins*
ness te ex^nad finaneial aid te build tilie nieh publieii»d High Asmn Qatt*^
Ihe High Bwn m es»Sed el«>Ali mas the emmtMUm ef

gramiiese

eem«ffii$ il»vele|NB»nt plans fe^nalated by ^e new Egyptian xefiM. \t t0
finan^ the dan was a fexnidable ptetolan. liw tetal cost wis estiaHtted te
be in

9xm»n ef eoe billien dellays.^ Sinee Bf^t he^rtelf m» unable te

piNSVi^ liie neeessary iN»ids,

af^^aroaehed #w g^imnents ef the IM^d

States and the iftiited KingdiMi and the InternatiemI Bai^ fm fieecinslxuetiim

i Qtio-tod in Joachin Joesten, jg«
^

pp* I20»l*

<22# fiit»> p« 202*

^ Haapty N* Uomwd^ "The Develepsaent ef United States Policy in tte
Near Bast,* |l.f# Pepaytiwit ft §ta.te Btillatin Apadl 9, 1956, p. 12.
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and OiVtl^^pfMiit (v^ld Baidc) in late 1^, seekingi tlwir

of

project#^
tMf years af-tor igypt piaoid her af^licatima with the West fm tiia
fiRaneial si^^M»rt» no definite answer me fivea by the Mistem f^jmnents
ear t^e Wi^ld Bank. %^t> iNif|>dratel.y unitinii to start w&xk m

daa

site, leit that the Itestern finaneSjig offer was prolonged uniwcessarlly.
On Oeteber 13» 1955, an official %i^tlan spokesaan declared that tiie Sov
iet Uiii<m had offered t© finaivse §f»^d el-All.^ A few ^ys later, the
Egyptian a»ijassador in Mshia§tm lnfoi»ed tim State Departoent that his
govemisint mild p^fer to have Hbste^ rather tiian Swiet help in ecnstructii^ the daffi»^ Th«i§h Premier liasser ciBifirmd that tiie Swrilet Uitliai
had fflsde Hi® offer several tiiaes, he e«s^sized his preference f®r a Isst*
em offer*
CfflRfr^tted sdth the possibility of a seriaws Soviet eswje»ie cei^eti-'
tien in

Middle East, t^te Unitad States and the ^teitad Kingd^ on Deeem-

b%x 17, 1^, offered to assist Qfs^t in the initial v^erk e<»iRacted wi-^i
the laiilding of the High Asmn D»®»^ tJInder ttis Western offer, a total of
$270 ailUon mal4 be raiaed in ttie following *«yi a loan of $200 «illl«i
fr€» th® Wwld Bank at 4 per cent interest, a §ra«t of $56 nilli^n fro*^
tAtit»d States, and a grant of $14 KUli^ fron Britain*® Die fownweffts
of Miat ^raaany, France, ami Italy also aimoiii^d their xeadiiMSS to

* Keith itieeloek, |g,* ci|*# p* 187*
®
6

|2I

IISS* Oct^r 141 1955, p. 4*

October ISi 1955, p. 3.

7 Middly East JgiMriMil* "Chronology," %rlng 1956, p. 182*
@ Joachin J^stan, jg* cH*, p* l^.

41

contxiliRite eonsiderable mmnts*^
Thust

effort to seek financial assistanee to build her giant

project* Kliich had aroused little interest in the Western tworld for tv^o
years, was now given full consideration.^^ Despite Secretary DuUee'
statement that "tne inter&st of the U.S. and of ti^ !torld Bank in this dam
goes back two years and more and is not attriixitabl© st all to tl-ie Soviet
prt^osal,**^^ It «sks evident that the Western offer was «ade <mly after the
Soviet Unitm had ann<ainced her readiness to assist %wt to kiild th® High
E^a. An informed observer stated that in the absence of its "fear of Mos
cow's economic penetration in Egypt", the West «K3Uld probably ha^^ not ser
iously entertained the idea of financir^ the project.^^
Negotiations between Egypt and the Western Powers to iu^jlement the
United States-British-World Bank offer soon tegan* The World Bank zequired
Egypt to follow a scamd fiscal policy and to avoid inflatism, which sight
impair Egypt's credit. The Bank also sti{:ailated that Bgypt oust reach an
agreesent with the Sudan en the problem of adjusting lorater distributi^
after the dam has been constructed.^^ The Egyptian goverm»nt pieced that
these conditions «^ld be observed. iSien the Soviet AsAjassader in Cairo
remarked that the Soviet IMitm still intended te participate in financir^
the High Bam "unless there is seoetiiing in Egypt's agreenent with the West

^ Mi'
V,M. Dean, "Strt^gle for Middle East,* gg. clt.« p. 60.
^pa^rtiBent of State Rilletin January 2, 1956, p. 12.
V.M. Dean "Aswan and Suez," 55. cit.. p. 6.
13 Keit^ ^eelock,

cit.« pp. 189.
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«toich specifiealiy txeludes us,** a U.S. official replisd that ftissian exclusiw was ifflplied tn the issteapn offer.^^
In June 1S^6, Soviet Foreign Minister Dimitri Shepilov visl^d Cairo.
Al»Ahraa« a Cairet^ dally, reported that the Soviet Foreign Minister had
again polnttd mit his country's td-llln^nees to help Egypt finance es-'Sed
gl-All. The pap^r added ^i^at he had pr^dsed i^ypt a $1.2 billion-dollar
loan for the purpose. The loan ms to carry two per eent interest and
was to

repayable over a period of sixty years.President Nasser,

however. Bade it clear that his country was still favoring the Anglo-

American offer. Ha Instructed the Egyptian ambassador in iashlngtwn to try
to reach 2 final agreesient with the An^rlcan goverranent.17 However, before
the ambassador had a chance to carry «Jt the Cairo instructions, he was
summoned on July 17 to the State Depsrteent and ms handed the following
memorandumi
At t^e request of the government of ^ypt, the
United States joined In Decea^r, 19^, with the United
Klngdcra and with the World Bank in an offer to assist
Eg^t In t^e Cf»)structlon of the High Dan on the Hlle
at ksmn* Ibis project is one of great magnitude. It
wmild require an estlnated twelve to sixteen years to
cswplete, at a total cost estl»ated at sorc 1.3 billion
dollars, of nlileh over $9(K} fflilll^ai represent local
currency requlrei^nts. It involves not merely the rights
and Intersts of Egypt, but of other states tdhose waters
are contrlbiitoiy, including the Sudan, Ethiepia, and
Uganda. Ihe Deeeffiber offer e^te^^lated an extensl^ by
th United States and the United Kingdom to grant aid to

Mi'
Tia^s. June 23, 1^6, p. 4.
In June l%6, Masser, by a vote of 99 per eent of all Bg^tlan
eligible voters, was elected President of the Egyptian Republic. See
R.I.I.A*, C|^.
p. 2SG.
Keith VOieeloek, jg. clt.. p. 193.
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help fiminee c«rtain early phases ®f the werk, the offsets
el «^ich wmild be confined solely to Sgypt^ and with the
understanding that aeci»^lishnent of t}^ project as a «^ole
wiHild TO(pire a satisfactory xesoluti^ of the questi^ of
Nile mtBs rights. Another i^>ortant considerati^i bearing
upctfi the feasibility of the umlertakif^ and thus the prac
ticability of Aneriean aid was Bg^tian willingness aiMl
ability to concentrate its econ<a«aie resources upon the vast
reconstruction parogran*
Developments within the succeeding seven m^^^s haw
not been favorable to the success of the project^ and the
United States govemaient has cfmcluded that it is net
feasible in present cireunstances to participate in the
project. Agreement by ^e riparian states has not been
achieved* aiKl the ability of figypt to dtevote adequate
resources to assure the project's success has becem mmee
uncertain than at the t^ the offer v^ats aiade.
In the ef^» the note e^qpres^d United States* hc^s that the withdrawal of
the offer \^ld not is^ir Aaerican-lgyptian friendly relations amJ pro
mised American co^ration in aidir^ Egypt to iafjrove the econooic conditicm of its peqple.^®
In line with the United States goveria^nt's withdrawal of its offer,
the British goverrwent aimminced the cancellation of her offer of $14 ailion. The World Bank loan of $2(K) milliont tfihich had been dependent m the
prc^osed Anglo-American offer, a®s autonatically withdrawn.^^
»

*

*

It seems appr^riate at titis point "to analyze the real causes behijnd
Astern withdrawal of the High Ifem offer and the Iramadiate repurcussions
of the withdrav«l.
It was generally agreed that the reasons given by the American

PepartiBent of State Bulletin July 30, 1956, p. 188.
19 Joachim Joesten, 30. cit«» p. 129.
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gevexnfflsnt f©r witiihoidiiiig aid t@ finance the %^tian Da® mxm syperfieial
mms. There were at least five

considersticms that priasrily aiotivs*

ted Wishii^ton's contreversial d&eisi<m* (i) Dulles was annoyed at Nasser's
playing a gaa® ©f "eeonoiaic neutralisa,*' by "pitting" testern offers against
1^<^e of tJie Soviets.^ fiasser iwver abandes^d negotiations with the Soviet
Wnim to finance the daia even after the V^st had ewnitted itself to iMiild
the project. {2) President Kasser*s recognition of CoMunist Chirn in JSay
1^6, caused naicfi irritatlcai to *iiashii^t<tfi»

Secretary ftilles called the

j^cognition "a regrettable aetiOTi.*^! (3) Thei« ms a powerful Ziiariist
lobby pressing the U.S* C^igress and tiie goverraaent t© jwcansider the extentien of financial assietanee to Egypt.^ (4) A cotton lobby, spspathetic by a la^e grwip of Souther Congressraen, <^osed Bfeishington's assis
tance to huild the High Daa. Southern cotton planters were afraid that the
daa woJld increase Egvpv1.5n c3ttfm-pr«3ucing area, thereby causing new cmb*
petition lor -the Ifeiited States,^^ (5) Periiaps most ln|>0rtent of all ms
coneeri^d witJi th® reports received in Ifeshington ttiat ^e Russians mi-e not
in a positiwi to assist Egypt to fcwild the project. Only four days before
his wit^idrasfdr^ ©f the offer Dulles announced that "it is i^ossible that
the Soviets aay aove

**24

in.

-j^is

belief encewraged

State Departoent to

decide that it v?as safe to risk the Egyptian leader's displeasure.
There vsere other forces at play that helped fjer- ipitate ^feshington's
20 H.a. Ellis,

c|t., p. 192.

Middle East Journal« "Chrwaology," SufflEser 1956, p. 283.
H.B, Ellis,

C U . , p. 192

23 Ibid.
As quoted in MaChester Guardian Weekly. July l^, p. 3.
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decision. First, the period since the lisstem offer was oade evidenced a
contimied attack on iestem influeiuie in the Middle East by radio Cairo.
^Ypt never halted its moral and material sijqf^rt to Wie Algerian nation
alist rebels in North Africa against France and ttie (tenese revolt in South
ern Arabia against Britain.
Secamdly, ig^t cwtimied the ban on the passage of Israel-lw«ind ships
thr^gh the Suez Canal. Moreover, the arriwl of large quantities of Sov
iet bloc a»Bs to Egypt ms regarded by the U.S. gcvemmnt as ei^ngering
the very existence of Israel. The ftepublican platform of August 19©6, de
clared that •&# effort to secure p«»aee betnesen the Arab nations and the
Jewish state "was upset by the Soviet bloc sale of arms to Airab countries.
On Febxuary 24, 1%6, Secretary IMlles, addressing the Senate Foreign Re
lations CoBfflittee, clarified toe United States positi@n vis-a-vis toe state
of Is3ra€l. He stated "to.e preservation of toe state of Israel, as I said
before, is \sliat I regard as 0i» of to« essential goals of United States
foreign

"^6

policy.

Thirdly, toe decision to cancel the Anglo-Anerican offer was pez^aps
prta¥>ted by reports concemir^ increasing Ciwrainist inflitence on toe Cairo
regise. xh# Western offer Mhich, according to tl«se reports, intended to
pz^vent Eg^t fn^ leanii^ toward the Swiet orbit did not achiewi tois
aisi. For exanple, Halter Z. La<|^ur in toe May 1^ issue of Cwaaentary
pointed €«it toat toe CoBEraunists mxe very influential in toe army, govern
ment, and press in Egypt. He stated that Nasser "IMS each sonto swerved
IXf

II I.

I

I.I

M

I

•

^ 3M Ite

III.

.

Tiaes. August 22, l^, p. 15.

26 Ibid.. February 26, 1956.
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fuTth«r

his professed ^utralisffi" to « pro-Soviet sentlBent.^

Finally, Hassfit's uneoB^roaisii^ stand agsinst foreign alignment,
partieularly his untiring eaaf^ai^n against any Arab stales* involwsaent in
th® Baghdad Pact, m$ very antagonizlr^ to iflesteam statesasn.

Therefore,

8mm^ measu3res mst he taken to stqs Nasser frera causii^ a future collapse
to the Baghdad Pact*

Withdrawing tiha offer to tajtild

the High Dam mild per»

haps help tO|:^ls his regisie, thus eliminating •Uie most potential ei^iay to
pro-*%atem alliance in the area.^

*

»

#

Nasser received tihie mm of tdie vdthdrawal of Wie S^storn offer v^ile
he was discussing tli© policy of n^-allgwsent with Indian Prla» Minister
ffehru and Yugoslav President Tito on the Island of Brioni, Yugoslavia.

Hie

news v«s a blow to Jtesser's prestige, particularly the U.S. government
charge that the Egyptian econc«y wa^t strorvg

to sustain ^^t's

share in ccwistructing the giant project.
Nesser's first expressed reaction cam on July 24, l^, lAsn ha vio
lently attacked the tfnlted States government of creatlr^ false rumors ab(»it

mskm&s, of -Oie Egyptian eeon^y. He was reported to have statedt
If rumors In Washington tries to make c«t that th©

27 seg aijQ Laquer's book, CoEronim and Hationalisa in the Middle
East of 19^, of M^ich the U,S. Ifeiis aroj Mterld Report. August
1^, re
printed the passage dealing"ii5^th the Soviet-Egyptian relations. See also
Ray Alan, •'Cairo-Soviet Gateway Into the Middle East,"
^public. Nowfiter, 14, 1955, pp. 6-7.
^ Keith iPJheelock,

clt., pp. 194-7.

cit.« p. 204| see also K.B. Ellis,

clt.« p. 47.
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Egyptian eeon<»iy is net etr^ en<%igh te wazrant Aaerican
aid I x^ply t ehol» witli rage itot y(m «tlU r^ver succeed to
wrcfering us abmt ex exercising yeus tyranny ewr us, because
we knm mt path of freedm, of bmom, ax of dignity*«••
Publish yoNjr c^H^miques in leshington arui tiien censider ^ist
if these cosnuniques are sincere and due to misinfor^ticm en
your part tiwt is wfert^nate, but if they are lies desigiwd
to mislead <^ini©n then Hmt is awch greater aisf^rtime f©r
the werld PoKwr «#)ich has c(Misti^ted itself iiie ch8Bf>ion of
llbarty.3®
Cft the saiae day Soviet Aobassador to Cairo raaffiiiaed his country's
i«adiness to finance the daa if Uie Egyptian leader asked for it.^^ Ch
July 26, Masser armoumced to a rally at Alexandria the nationslizaticm of
the Universal Suez Canal C^any. All profits accruir^ to %ypt froo the
Canal operati<ms, Nasser said, would

used to finance the construction of

es-Sed el-Ali.32

mmmmr

«mmmk

mmmmmm

The nationalization decree piwided for CMapensation for the share*
holders and holders of constitwent shares. It declared that shareholders
"will be c^pensated for the shares and bonds they possess at their value
estimated at the closing rate m the Paris Bcwrse prior to the date on v#iich
this law entered into effect." The payment of the ccHspensation wuld be
made «toen the %yptian governasent took ovar "all the funds and property of
the nationalized coi^any."^^
€n July 27 Britain and tha United States protested J^ypt's nationali-

Manchester OisKiian Wsekly* July 2^, 1^6, p. 2.
^l<Mle £ast Journals "Chronology," August 1956, p, 4(B.
on

U.S« Departaent of State, The Suez Canal Problem, a Documentary
Publication (Washington, D.C., U.S. Govertwienc Press, 1?©6)7 p. 28.
The Go^mraent of %ypt! White Paper on the NationalizatiCTi of the
Suez Maritime Canal Ciynpany (Cairo,"Goverraaent Press 1<^6), p. 4.
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zatlon of the Canal.

Tha British protest statadi

The Eg^tlan govsrjMnt has proraulgated a law pur
porting to nationalize the Suez Canal CsMspany as from
yesterday, July 26, 1956. Har ?4ajesty's government pro
test against this arbitrary rction, v^ich constitutes a
serious threat of the freedom of navigation on a asaterway of vital international iaportance. They reserve all
their rights and those of United Kingdom nationals as
sanctioned by the agreements in force. The responsibility
for the consequence nsist rast entirely upon the Egyptian
§c^ri«»rit«^

The United States deelarddi
The annoynGwiient by tiie %^tiafi gove^MBant cm July 26
with respsct t® the seizure ©f l^e installations of the
Sue? Canal Coi^jany (Harries far-i^aehit^ |j^>lic8ticms. It
affects the nations «ii®se ectmcsiaiss depend upon
pro
ducts «d)ich iBove tinrcAigh this internati^aI tsaterway ai^
the naritim cwintries as wall as the onmers of the Coafsany
itself. Til© United States goverr^nt is consulting urgently
with other gownwents cwiceiwied.^^
French reaction

amn vielent. After an emrgency oeetii^ ©f the

French Cabinet on July 27, a spokesa^n for the French gonrerrownt declared
that his country would favor military ©ccupatiffln ©f iiie S^ez Canal if Bri
tain would jodn France. French Preaier Mollet accused Nasser as a wouldbe Hitler.36
Qit the other hand, tiie S@nriet geverrawnt annwinced w July 29 that
Egypt's nationalizati^ ©f the Canal Gi«opany was in confomity witti internatiimal law. Ihe govexnnent ple#ed full support to Egypt and appealed
for noctez^titm of iisstern reaetions.^^
Varying reactiens ftm ottier countries were reported. Indian Prim

^ Middle Eastern Affairs. August-Septeiriber, l%6, pp. 299-3(K3.
^ &M*
Jewrrwl. August 16, 1^, p. 397.
Urn i£S X2£l Xiaes. July 30, 19^, p. 20.
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Minister liehxu said that

Urn natienalization case as a sign of

ing of Euxt^an dminatien of Asia and

v«eaken-

MicMle East. President Hasser

3^caived fir« support frasa all Arab gevwjKBsents. President Tito of Yugo
slavia infozned Itesser ii»at his country wmild stand with Eg^t in the pre
sent confiiet* Israel ai^ aost NATO aeflabers, hoMSver, c^ruteRs^d Egypt's
act.^
#

•

*

Before turning to the mxt phase of the Suez erisis, it is meessary
to consider tt^ feasibility ©f lashii^ton's decisi®n to withdraw ttte offer
to help finance tiie Aswan Da®.
It was generally agreed ^e decisi<m was hastily m&de and did not take
into eonsideiratien a possible violent 3%8Cti(Mn fr®a tte ^j/ptian leader.
The vrithdrawala in faet» damaged 'Astern, especially AiBeriean^ prestige and
interest in the Middle East. Moreovar» the tiaii^ ami B»nner of ^ of^
fsr*s withdrawal were particularly Inadvisable. l|te

Statesman and Na

tion (August 4, 19&6) consented that the publication by the State Departoent
of iiie eancellatitm of the offer
coincidMI with the end of the ierioni talks....Nasser
inteipreted
decisiem as a deliberate persmial reI»jff> tii^d f(xr a meie^nt vtien its effects cfft his om
position would be greatest. It was inevitable that he
wtmld attaint stum sort of reposte.
Vera M. Dean e^qji^ssed her dissatisfactlm wi^^ action of Washington
as follows*
....Anytme faailiar with the teaper not only of the
Egyptians but of other n<m-Westerners #io have lived

^ IM Middle East Journal. August 1^, p. 397.
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W0stsm rule eould haw predicted tiiat the sudden
)ii1^drati8al by the United States^ v^ieh Britain seccmdbdt
of its offer t© help build ti» High Assan Da» swwild bring
soiae kind of vigorous retort from Cairo»^^
Prime Minister Nehru of India voiced his disaj^roval ©f "Uie United States
goverwwnt decision. He annaineed cm Ai^st 8i ^ore than the decision#
tiie way it «as daw h«rt Eg^t's pride ami self-respect and disregarded tiie
pe^le*s sentiaent.**^®

Policy Bull»tln> Septeaber 15, 1956, p« 6,
^0 As quoted in Ibid*

CHAPra V
iHE CRISIS or sun
Today, citizens rights hav»
Iwen restored to ^ir oiffwrs.
Our righta in the Suez Cami
have been restored to us after
100 ^i^ars* Today* we acbially
achieve true soirareignty* ^nie
dignity ai^ true pride.
Gasal Ab^l Iksser^
Zt is believed tSiat the violent reacti<m of the Ifttited Kingdon ar^
France to the nationalization of the

Canal Cenpany was prated aainly

by 'tiie anti~&ritish activities of Hasser in the Asrab vK^rld, and to his
aeti^w assistance to llie anti-French rebels in Algeria.^ If %^t had fol
lowed pre-«i»8tem policies* ^itish and French reaction to the Smz Canal
nationalij»tiQii night not have been so strong.
In legal tezfis» the nati^lizati^ of the Canal uns a procee^ral
aeti<m» tvithin the scvereign right of ^e state of Egypt, ^itain recogni3»d Egyptian sovereignty over tfie Suez Canal in the Ai^lo-Bgiflptian treat
ies of 1936 and 19S4» Article 8 of tlh« 1936 treaty stressed that^ Suez
Canil HAS "an in^ral part of Bgypt«**^ and article S of the 1954 agreeoent
re{Mated that "the

Maritise Canal«»»is an integral part of Bgypt*««"^

Not ^ly was the Suez Canal exclusively %yptian« but the nati^lized
^ An excerpt of iiaaser's speech on l^e natimialization of Suez Canal
Cmmmf* See «ie Departaent of Statet 2ISi
Canal Problem - A Docuaentary Publieati<Ms«
28-9.
2 Mi<ifaiX<» East Journal. Autumn 1956, p. 395,
3 For text of ^ tareaty, see Iterewitz,|£, £1^., p. 2C®.
^ Mi*
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e(M^>any was Inedxperated under th« l*w of
hoMRVort *w#re in no

Britain and Fnneo,

for legaiistie serti^les, they reeolled at #ie

tJiei^ht of the a»ea Cawil eoning under Egypt's unfettered ecmtrol."^
The Iftilted States, Britain, and France x^aeted to the nationalization
of the

Canal by fz«ezing all Egyptian assets within their respective

countries.^ Then ^ July 29, 1^, Britain and France urged t}M U.S. gov*
emaent to Join tiien in devisliif a policy to put ^ nationalized Suez
Canal ui^r intemati^l jurisdiction. They also pr^o^d ^t Eg^t be
guaranteed a special positlcm in tiie adninistratlm of -^e canal and a sub
stantial share in collecting revenues.^
€li August 2, t}» l^ree Western Pmmm announced their intention to call
a conference for the Canal users in Linton in order to c<msider proposals
for creating an inteinuititRial authority to be responsible for

cqperation

of the Canal* On August 3, Secretary Dulles, In a radio^televlsicn address
to the Aserican pe^le, called Nasser's **seizure** of the Canal as "an angry
act ef retaliatitm against fancied grievances*** He maimed ^at "to perslt
'ttiis to go unchallenged wmild be te encourage a breakdoim of intemati^al
fabric up^ v^ich the security and the well-being ef all peoples depend*"
Guiles t^en es^ressed ctmfldenee that the f^thcomlng L^on conference
weuld be able to set up a new machinery for an efficient and acceptable adainistration of the Canal.^
^ Keith Wteelock, |£). cit*« p* ^9*
^ Mi*

^ Ilia

East Journal, August 19S6, p. 397.

® Md.
^ M'l*

ind Iforld ttepffirt. August 10, 19^, pp. 38-9.
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TiieRty*f(»iZ' nations mtm invitod

th«

e^fd£ttiiet«

h»ld its iixst sedtii^ on Ai^st 16,^0 Bgypt nM ^^smm refused to atttnd,
^t Ali i«Jb7i» Nasser's f@r«ign affairs adviser^ att«i»led th« M«tti{^s a$
an

Qull«i intr@#i6#d a pr<^osal liiieh called fer the ertatieoi

9f a Suez Canal Board tntiiieh «^ld providte international supervision of
Canal <^rati^« By a vote of eighteen in favor and four (India, the Sov
iet Union, Indoi^sia, and Ceyl«m) against,^ prc^osal «ias adqsted.^^
The cmi&mmB then decided to s»nd a aissi^ closed of representati^s
of five iMsriser-states headed by PriMt Minister Beniies of Australiito Egypt
to present Nasser witti tiie tfecision of th« maiority.l^
Meantf^ile, stateiRents by British and Frenoh high autiiorities nade it
clear that tiie two nations were dbtereined to pjwswnt Sgypt fr« exeoutir^
its deo:raes of i^e nationalizatieiM of ^e eanal. PrSioe Minister Sdea of
Baritain liaolared, "the British Govextiaent is dbtersiimd that <aur essential
interests in ^is area mist be safefuarded, if necessary by ailitary aeti^,
and that iiie imdfUl preparatic»is aust be mete* Failure to ke^ the canal
inteasaticHTial would Inevitably lead to the loss of msi by one of our inter
ests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty^s (kmxment
The countries Invited to attewJ ttie 6<mferenoe weret Pakistan,
H^nvay, Sweden, Port»i^al, Australia, Canada,
Soviet Uai^, tlui United
States, Britain, France, In^ia, Scidt^sia, l^n, Ceylon, Mgfptt Oreece,
Siast CSetnany, Japan, Dera^rk, Hthiepia, I^w iealafHl, tiu^ey, %}ain, and
Italy. 2^
Times Waeklv Review. Ai^ust 13, IS©6, p, 56,
R.I.I.A,,

clt.. p.

Greece refused to participa'te in tiie C^ferenee because it was tiien
^ food teros with ^ypt, «^ich sui^orted Gntek claim to Cvp»is*
la Ibid.
Herbert Feis, •Suez Scenarios A tanentable Tale,* ForeSan Affairs.
July I960, p. 602.
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ha<4 t© aet

ttlmm thay ewild not $t«^ »h®rt &f usli^ f^trce to pio"toct their

p©8iti#n."^^ Pineau, French Fox«ign Ministtz-f (foeiated ^at Fsrance would
not j^n^tnee the uXtisate use of military actiflm if neeeasary to empal
ita$s9T to abide by the London e^ferenee deeieion to put Hut caml undbr
internati<»ial control.^® In the iwantlne Anglo-Freneh foroea Isiild-t^ in
tite ttodil^rranean area be§m, ai^ France sent trocps to Cyprus*
!lisser refused the

pr^osal* eallii^ it a imasure infringing

^yptian sovereignty* He amaffiraed Bgiypt*^s willif^ness to guarantee passafe thrcui^h tiite Canal without discriainati^a develop

Canal for ex

panded ^^re use* iipose Just ami equitable tolls* and maintain te^nieal
efficiency*

In a pmm con^renee on Septei^r 2, tifte Egyptian lea^r

stated!
late will accept any soluticHft ^t d«W8 not affect our
sovereignty* lfite;»iational control n^ld affect mir sove
reignty* It is a satter of Interpretation, I knitm* but we
int#]^ret inte»ntti^l ccntrol to be a fo»i of colleetive
colonialisa* the ^ez Car»l is ^ypt^s ai^ the cospany
ttiat runs it is Egyptian* li> are willing to sign any agreeaent <toRaii^d by countries using
canal that weuld guarantee
firoe navigation Utrou^h ih9 caml*^^

the Western Big Ihree were annoyed by Bgypt's refusal of t^e Lond^
pr^osal* &it idiile ^e ^riean positie*^ still favored i^aceful settleisent
through ^otiati<Mis» i^itain and France wsre detemined to iiE^pose interna
tional control of the Canal* by force if necessary* On Septei^r 11* i^tish Priffie Minister Eden and French Fresier Mollet isstwd a joint eonaiinlque
in Londtm «l)ieh declaring t
14 J^*, pp. 599^600.
Ibid*, p. 601.
R*I*I*A** JJgl*

P* 205*

As <|uoted in Middle Eastern Affairs. Noveii^r, 1%6, p. 414*
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•
mtvml @f Psdsldent Nasset to mifetiate on ^is
basis the l^^on tmiemne^ pr^osti eseated a very grave
situaticMn.*.* The Ministers <lisi»issed ^e Ittr^er^imasures
to be taken ai^ reached foil agrement iq>en theai*^®
Gb Septei^r 12, '^e two heads of fovermmntt sent a letter to the United
{iatiiwis Seeyority Cwneil deelarii^ that letter's »ifusal to tiie eighteeiv-

m%lm prt^sal for internationalizati^ of ^e Sues Canal "is an a§graira*
tii^ of t}» si^titm* «hieh» if all«nNed to e^tiime, would eonstitute a
manifest danger to peace ami i^eurity.^i^ On tJie sane day, Iden told the
Hmise of ComuHis that

Misteni B|^ Tha»ie had decided to set

a

Canal Users' Aesoeiatim (SCUA) which m^ld be autii^i^d to act e«i behalf
of the eaml users. Bg^t w^ld reeeii^ pa-pMint for pswiding facilities
to the mw oi^anization* Eden tiamed if igi^t reused to eo-qperate in
iqpleaentin§ the mm plan, his g«vesi^nt and o-^er nsi^rs of the SCUA
would be free te take any necessary measures.^ Secretary Dulles, on
Septei^r 13, hastened to announce that although his goveriment strot^ly
supported the new associatimi, the ^ited Statas was not prepared to *'shodt
its way" through the canal.2i
Invitati^ were sent to the eifhtwen nati^ms that supported tlie pre
vise Umdoit conference pr^osal for a se6<»y

ccmference te

held

on Septei^r 19* The iHixpose of the i»w conference nas to pnit the SCIM pro*
posal into action. On Septenber 15, the U.S.S.B. govexfusent amounced its
€^positic«ii to the SCUA. It described tba association as a "great

^ For the text of ^e coomnique, see ibid., pp. 396*7.
United nations, Sewirity Council. Official Recordst Docuaent S/3645,
20 |h£

York Times. September 13, 1956, p. 1.

Ibid.. Septeuiber 14, 1996, p. 1.
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P70vo6«tlon" against %yptian sowitd^nty* It eauti^nad that any amtd
attack against Igi^t to seize the eanal «^ld eause i^zepaxable dai^e to
the eanal inetallati^e arul would lead to the destzittOti<H^ of oil fields and
pipelirws in the Arab wofld.^
Seci^etairy Dulles was ih« fiirst to address the l&^Mtim L^on eonfezenoe osi Seplw^r 19«

outlined a six-point plan for the

(l^ the pwsent 18-nation assooiati<»[i should ccmtiiuiet (2) ttie assoeiati^
should tai»i the joint l8-nati<m prcfjosal of the first eonfez^noe as a basis
for negotiati^ witii Sgypti (3) it sh^ld haw a ^11 ^x«ting s^ff ready
to assist ships thro^^h tt» oanal{ (4) it shsitld have a i^ll govei«iing
board to keep aei^rs infi^effied of dewlopfflentsi (5) it should have "a lat
est w«»c4cing fund"i and

its aeabership would involve no obligation to

take enf^roeaent aetion against Egypt in

^ latter reifesed to co-

eperate with the ^Vlk» All smaberst it was heped, wmild **voluntarily take
suoh aotifm with respect to ^eir ships and tiie payment of eanal ^es as
vrauld faoilita^ tlie work of the associati^ ai^ build up its prestige and
authority, a#^ cflwsequently its ability to

*23

serve.

% not obligating meters of the assoeiaticm to take a collective act
ion in the event of Egypt's :rafusal of tiie new piraposal—in o^r w^s, by
leaving to the members ^e right to decide ir^pendently their respective
policy—it mi clear that the SCXJA c<»ild not make ouch success* Moreover,
Nasser refused to allow the pr^osed association to ihincticn in the eanal
area. After being cmivljiced tiiat Bgypt was not ready to alter its

22 Ibid.. Septe«ber 16, l^, p. 3.
23 For the text of the state«ent, see Mi^le Easteari Affairs.
Hoveffiber 1?^^, pp. 397-9.
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detoznination to naturalise th» canal, the British at^ Franee took ano^r
asasuxe* They ^tsuattod Wastei^ pilots sexving the IMW Egyptian Suez Oinal
Mitiiority to resign, h^ing to inpede traffie of the canal and thus to prow
Bfypt's nanageesnt of total failure.^ Egypt, however, proved her oo®petenee to run the c&ml dtospi-te the resignatioi\ of abt^t a hundred noivIg^tian pilots* The 0,S.S»R. |jn»»dla^ly provided Egypt with fifteen pilots*
Tw3 hundred more a^lieations mxe i^eeived by the Egyptian gon^rfuaent from
pilots of Aaerican, West (^raan, and other natlimalities seekir^ to replaee
those jsfco resSiimd.^
All tiwse atteai^ts against Egypt failed* The canal was uiHler Egyptian
control, and the mm authority was operating efficiently. Confronted vdtti
^is fact» ISas-tem Powers made new TOves. Britain and F^ince called for a
meeting of the United Natiws Security Council#

With a unaniaais voi» of

its fflsffibers tiie Ceuncil on October 13, 1^ passed a resolution eabcMlying
l^ie following principles! (l) firae and open twinsit through th« Suez Canal
without discrifflination, overt or covert — be it political or tedmicalj

(2) respect for the sovereignty of Egypt} (3) the insulation of the (^ra
tion of the canal frm the politics of any country} (4) the allocatimi of a
fair pr^^orti^ of the ^es to developing the canal} (5) the fixation of
tolls and charges by agreenent between Eg^t and the users} and (6) disfMJtes
between the aie« Canal Ceffif>any and tJie Egyptian goverwnent shcAild be set
tled by arbitratijm*^
The ieeisicm of ^e Security Ct^inoil e)f>ressed tiie general l«lief that
^ Joachiffi Jeesten»

oit*, p* ISd,

^ BM»» PP*
^ Iteited Naticms* Security Cwincil, Official atoord* 743 Beetir^.
Egyptf then not beii^ a msmber of tiie Security Couneil, suq^rted
these six principles*
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Biypt*s
of

of th« Sues Canal Ccnpany did not affoet the stai^e

canal as a vital ifiteniati^uil wmteTway* Traffic ^rou^h

eanal

eontiiMied to operate ne«ffially.^ Ships of all natioiMlitiest even two of
Israel's* passed withmit incident*^ igypt evsn allewed passage of ships
Kfliieh insisted on paying dNws to the esqptrqpriated ©aaapany in Paris.29 The
§er»ral belief was liiat the six priiieiples of IJie Security Council were an
expressim of the conciliatory a^od of ^e partios involved* Frasident
HistnhOdwir ^teribed tiie dlscussimis of the C«iincil as i^st gratifying
Egyptian F^l^n Minister Mc^dimid Fawzi expressed his gmewmamVa inten
tion to c«®ply »rtth tha new <laci$i<»is of ttie Security Council.
The hope tiiat a ftaal peacoflil solutitm te the aiez questiwn seeTOd
noif «d.^in reach* ifhad not actually been a^iewd, wis so<m shattered by
a suceessiOR of unfortunate e^nts. The Security Cmmcil's qpiiet deliberation appeared to be the ealii»»ss preceding a hurricaiw.
^itish and French leaders suddenly annminatd their disapproval of the
six principles endorsed by the United Mations.^^

October 16, ^e Brit

ish Priiie Minister and Foreign Secretary conferred with their French eminterparts in Paris* €l>servers believed that at this OMeting plans were drawn
to invade Egypt*^^ On October 16, Dulles again reaffirswd the United States*
intention of seeking a peaceful settleiMint to the Suez issws. He amiouni^d

M.E. Ellis, ^* eit*« p* 49| see also,
28 Ktitti %3Mteloek,

p* 240.

R.I»X»A*, <HP* cit*
30

Joachiffl Joesten,|£. £it*> p* 152.
Keitii Nheelock,

cit** pp. 240-1*

^* cit., p»
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his position to the xesosrt to nilltary ection and pledged his eounts'y's
support to vietlBs of aggression.®^
In the fiMantiaie, on Oetobear

news of quiet Israeli axmy Bobilizati^

lealmd to the eutside world*^ On the saoe day. President Eisenhower issued
a state®int referrii^ t® reports of Israel's "heavy i^bilizati^a of its a*»ed forces." He said he t^d learned that "the Isiraell oobilixatim has eon*
tii%M»d and has beeoi»» alsost coiqplete, with eense(|uent st^age of sany
civil activities." The President addbd tinat he had sent tK» oessages to
Israeli frirae Minister £:tivid Ben^Caurion urging Mm to exercise every pos
sible preeautl(»i to avoid an ^tbreak of war thez«. Eisenhower also dis
patched sinilar nessages of c^icern to neighborii^ Arab statesOn Oet^r 29, Israel launched a general attack against Bgyptian ailitary positions
alfi«^ the Eg^tian-I$:iraeli fr^tier, ai^ Israeli paratroopers landed iteep
in Egyptian territory. The first Israeli mr eorawnique stated 13iat her
invasion's object was to 8ei»» the Suez Canal.^^
^n and Mollet^ after a hurried sseeiili^ in L^dw

OctolMir 29,

issued a Joint ulti^tm callirmi m Bgj^t and Israel to halt fire witiiin
twelve hwirs and to withdraw their ailitary fori^s to a distant^ of ten
ffilles frfflta -ttie Suez Canal so that navigatlim thr««gh the Canal would not
be obstructed. Egypt was called

to peiaAt Ai^lo-French forces to

occupy Port Said, Issiallia, and Sues city. Bgi^t was warned ^at failure
to accept the texms of tiie ultlnatun wenjld "necessitate Anglo-French

^ 2E SlI

Times. October 17, 1956, p. 8.

^ 3M Middle East Journal. Winter 1^7, p. 79.
M SSS XBSk IMl* Oetober 29, 1956, p. 1.
Ibid.. October 30, 1956, p. 4.
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intervention in such strer^th as necessary to secure ctM^liancs."^^ The
0,S» govermi^nt protested to Britain and France against their demand
caXlii^ it "the »ost bmtal ultifflat%un in atodkim history.**^® It declared
that it was prepared to stqp all econosiie aid to Israel until ^at state
witiidrew its troe^s fxm Egyptian soil.^^ The Unitod States called for an
iMMidiate sessi^ of

Seeurlty C^ncil and circulated to the Cimcil

ffiei^rs a letter accusing Israel of coimitting aggressive act against
Eg^tian territory.'^®
Tim Se^rity Council on Octobtr 30. Britain and France vetoed first
an Aiaericsn draft resolutiim calling m Israel to wi^draw her forces be*
hii%d the true« line and mi other states to refrain fr^ using or l^reatanii^ fmm in the area* Their second veto was exercised against a Soviet
resoluticm of a sijiilar purpose

On the second dNiy Britain and France

voted, again opposing the rest of the C<mncil*s netibersf against calling
a s]^cial session of the Gemral Asseably.^^ ISeanwiiiile tahen the l2-h(»ir
altiteati» •jqpired id13» Egypt's reftisal to allow Anglo-French occupation,
British bibbers attacked nilitary targets in Eg^t.^^
I^e special $essi«»i of the

Assefflbly mt m itoimBber 1| and on

Noveariber 2, it called on Israel to withdiraw behind the amistice lints, and
Mi*» October 30, 1956, p. 4,
^ Ibid., October 31, p, 1.
Ibid.
M*» Yearbook 2|^United Hationf. 19S6, p. 25.
Ha &S

BiSI» Oetober 31, p. 1.

Ibid., Moveraber I, p. 1.
M Mi«idle Sast Journal. Winter 1957, p. 67.
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m all partita to eaasa fira. Tha rasolutimi did not brand any party as
an afgreasor.'^ When Britain ami Francs s^fiaaed to eooply, the AssaM>ly ssaolved en KowsO^r 3i (l) that tiie Saeratary-Qanaral should within ffartyaight hotirs subnit plana lor an aottrganoy Unitad Haticma police foreef

(2) ill^t the eeage<-fir« rtaoluti^ shcmld be ooiBpliad «d.th by all parties
within twelve hwra#^®
tiiw liait escpired* ^y Bgypt had aeoepted the ^solution*
Ismel had asked for farther olarifieation fxm tiw Seeretary-^neral on
^ resoltiti^t an attei^t to delay her eoKplianoe* ^itain and Franee did
not reply* but l^eir paraohutists were landing m Port Said early Monday,
Heveaber 5,^^ Iftiile the ^eretary^neral was preparing for the United
Hatl€»is police f«eree

late M^rtday, he rei^ived Israelis agreecient to a

oease«fliro* the note said nothing about its ndthdrawal to
axsistice
47
lim or ab«K«t the ^ted Nations polioe foree*
On November 6, tiie t«^
Western Powers infoimd Urn As^ffibly of their deeisicm to eease-fire at
Bidnight,^
Before Britain and France annixinoed their decision to eease fii«,
Soviet Preaier Bulganin issued a warning to tite tm Gentries and Israel
that they sh^ld stef:> titeir '*aggresslcsi*' against Egypt's sovereignty within
twelve h^rs* The Soviet yltisatan rwninded ^e three countries that titere

^
p. 28*

y*arbook £f the ttraited Nations > 1956 resolution 997 (ES-I),

^ Ibid., resolution 999 (ES-I), p. 29.
Be Middlf MSl iSEBl. «i«ter 1957, p. 68.
MM BSIS3E 2121IS^ - 1956, p. 30.
Bt Ms

Tines. November 7, 1956, p. 1.

62

tNiBZ* sta'tos "that possess all kinds of modem destjmotive weap@as" n^ieh
"eoiild at the psesent tias, instead of sending naval ®r ti* fojrees to ttw
sh^s" of ^itain, Fx^nce* and Israel, "use other sieans sueh as roeket
meapem."^® Bulganin ejqpnssed Soviet ^texcainatim "to o^sh ti» afgress«W8 by the use of force and to restore peaee.*®® Ti» Soviet Union, in the
mantioe proposed m Kovesyber 6» a joint aetitsi vAUi tihe United States*
with l^e lAiited !teti^s sanetievi, to use anaed forces of the two states if
there ms no eease*fire in Egypt Md'tiiin twelve

Ihe United States

rejeeted the Soviet proposal as "unthinkable."®^
Since ^e begiiming of hostilities« the Arab world had shown stror^
solidarity with Sgypt* The anti-invaders* :»aetl^ lamdiately after tiie
mT had begun dealing heavy blows at the Middle Bastem interests of Brit
ain and France. Ihe Iraq Bstroleoa C^Bap«ny*s p^lines across Syria were
blonsi up{ disojrtters flaaied up in Kuwait* BahraiJi and Qatar (the latter two
were Aiwb oil pto<fcicing territories under British protection

Saudi

Arabia or^red tin Arabla-Aaejrlcan CH.1 C'oapany (AE^O) not to provide
Britain and France wi^ oil.^ Ihe Peking of the Arab world giv«n to Bgypt
was described by jroaehin Joesten as follomt
Iftat had not been anticipated was that the
entire Arab World* with rare unanlnlty* would leap

Mi'9 N«*»»ber 6, 1956, p. 1.
^ Ibid.
P»
P»
^ Joaehln Joesten,
^ JEM

clt.. pp. 160-1*

Tiaes. November 4, 1956, p. 1.
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ovartorow of Nasstx'? By tiw Iseuaneo of toeir ultiaa^ of Oetoboir 30»
1956, ^tain and Franoa pyesantad Egypt with two alta^mativasi Bgyptian
6W»ant to Anglo»Fveneh oeetq>ati^ of ttia Canal« ot a foreifola intorventiim
of two P««Mi78. Fvaitea and Britain, hcHWYort did not dtaand tha ZsYaalis to
go baek to thtir OI«R iteirritoiry* hut oonsantad to toa Istaali troepa baing
statiemad tan alias aast of toe oanal. These is season to believe toat toe
invasion ms psesaeditatod by Issael, Fsan^t and toe United Kingdom, this
belief was shased by SOM U*S; psess* On Meysmbes 4, 1956 T^ Hgv Yoslc
Tiaes stated Hueh of tht evi^nee toat has beei* bsonght os hinted at toe
proof of Anglo-Fseneh-Zssaeli eollusim dbsived fstm toings seen and whisi:NBsed in Tel Aviv in toe easly da^ of toe eaiqsaSgn.*' Time (Novei^s 12,
1^)was »»e blimt in pointing out a possible psios assangeaent among toe
thne c€i«itsies of the $eh«M to invade Egypti
Israel's F49«el^n Ministry talked of "toe iinesqpeetad intervention of Britain and Franee."
Britain's Foreign Secretary Selwyn iloyd protested
*Ihere was no prior words between us." Despite
their words, toere was plenty of evidenoe to shew
toat to* two attacks ware plam^sd in eollusi^n
("e^^stration" was the Frenito wc^d for it)* In
tois 6(»ispix«ey, France was the instigator, ^itain
a belaitod partoer, and Israel toe willing trigger*
*

*

•

It was an unquestionable fact toat the Anglo»Frenoh»I^eli invasion
of %^t ended in diasal failure* Gn toe dooastie aiMl intesmational scenes,
Kasser scored a political victory, whito pexhaps eould never have been
achieved witoout toe tripartite intervantim in Bg^t* world ^inim as
e}q:>ressed at the Ibiited Nations rostrtm believed Egypt to be a victim of
aggressicm and rallied strongly behind her* The Ijnvaders wire condewied
for toeir pursuance of toe outdated "gun-boat diplomacy*" Except for
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Sxah st«t»s»^ m th« othtr. had

eausad tha nost aayisua pelitiaal aiMi mmm&» oriais IA mwUm l^itapa
siiHE* W«tld Wair XX* €ti Jai^ty 2» 19S7«

ahsrofatid

Sm« Canal

Agm«iant #1 X9i4» aakiai^absrofatlon xvttitaitiva to Oeti^sr 31» XSId6,
tiaa of tha fixst

aiar tald m Fort Sald*^ 7^ figyptian

mmm alii^tad tha last smoiant of Irtish inlXuen^ In Bg^t*
itian the CanaX laa x«i|Miiiadi grttain and ftaaea* laekins any othas
iw«itt»ia9 paawlt^ tliaix i^lps

pay t^la to

fox'^ asa of ^

aanal* Hiila dIpXmatie x«lati^s l>atNaaii Btitaifi aiwl i^i^t wota 3iN»st«wd
In Dai^n^y 1999 afta» a sattlMniiit had haan vaaebid batman igypt ami tiia
natliKMiliaid
fm

Canal

aarliax' in ^ yaat» tha Alfoxian stxtt^la

pxavcmtid liia lai^um to n^emal xalations hatman Bgypt aiy

fiai»fia tBiMl tha aatly fMirt of Urn f9»s lf6a«
1h« aliainati^ of Angtlo^fiaa^ inllMnai in Egypt and nttdi of
ifiddla Hat lalt tha finitad

to pliy a Xazgair sola in iim affaii^s of

ai^« Umtwmt ^ OnitiHl States |H»alti«s

ik^ atxang^nad*

Hisr imo«»^iMpBising sttffedl aga:^t Anflo-Fminc^Xsiniali ai^taaeion and har
imsiiaiivingi adhasNpmoa to Initad Miti«na*

m

pla^ IMIX

in a "SII^QM:^ la^l positim" in Hia Aimh «ind«^ MGomovay* kmtiea had
navat pxavtensly haan iny^vadln Kldd:Mi itat ooloaial aotivitlas* At tiia
and of tha S^az hoatilitiaa i^at pa^la of tha ataa had av«a fosgottan tiiat
tha Iftiitad Statas* ndti^draml of

fiigh Aaima Qm offa^r wis an ai^nt

^
Syria* Saudi Axthia» and ¥a«in l^iHca off folati^ nit^
botili Qm»% Birltain and Firanoii Xta^ and Jotiten aavatad salatiwta «dlth
ftmm only*
®

^

SaiSSss aaMx» •?«»*•** a. iw, p. 3*

&!Stataaaan and tft^tlon* Jl^nnaTy 5, 1957* p. 9*
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72
of •emmiie
dtditaiad to tha sii^teatfieo of
iwtti^l ifidtpti»i«itM.
It would, in tlio toosmd pjuioot tu^otixt tho
EmmUm to uradtxttieo in tiio •mm vogiim
of
niUtoty tstistanet aiMi eo«po»ti<m idli^ tny natiflm mt
§wmxp of i»ti«ns irtiic^ dtsitos i^oh tid*
It iie»idi In iih» IMxd plt6o» t«tbotiiw sueh
tssistti«Ni %mi oooposttioa to inoJUidlt Hit oiployaont of
ii3m mwm4 imm* 6i ^^tod Stales to mmm ami ptotoet tdie 1»t3rit«rial intogrlty SIMI ^Utieal. indtpti^noo
of sti^ nations xtqpwstliig S«N^ aid t§ainst mmH awtd
ai^xossien ftoii any nati«fi eontrollod lay intoaoatiiNMiJL
oeaNiiniMi*.**^!!^ aii^iHrity weaid luit
oxtyeistd osMwpt
at tlui ^six« of tlio natic»i attaolctd.*®
Qne-half billion dollats was dos^natod to strongt^n tht a»ia afainst tho
liixoat of Seviot "sobvotsieat*" as dlstinot fren tlw i^tJdght as^xossion
liiieh al(^ was to bo eivottd undtt ike Ooei^int*^^

It was gononlly boliovod l^at

saoooss of

Mould to a §foat oxtont dofstnd on tN i«if»«f»o of

H&ddlo Qist*^^ Egypt was f3io fivst eoiintanr

Eiso^owir E^ootxino
oouatarlAs of Urn Aartb

srsftiso any assooiation id'tii

it«^ Its pxoss attaekod It as btins ano'^r Nestsm atteiq>t to intoriNxo
in tl» intoxnal affairs of the knh eouatvios*^ As a xoiwilt of Bgypt*s
attilsidt tOMSd ttm doetsrint* all Imt tluroo Aswb govoamants—liati, Lobammt
mi Jorcton—miNsod or at least did not amouneo tlwit aeoiqpitan^ of

Affairs* Fotamaty 19®7, pp. 62-8.
11 Joachim Joesten,

clt.« p. 172.

12 ^ohR C. CaMpbell, "Ftsai Sootrlno to Poliey in tho Middlo Bastt*
Foftian Affaiifs. April 19S7.
13 Iho Piiblio Affairs I^titato,
poaco (Rashingtcm, D.C., n.d.)» p. 157.

Ibid., p. 157.

S«y?,l9PWat|h

n
Gf ^ d«6tiri»i tmi
Nist«i»i ii«%i«is 6iii8*d

emUm94 attains iqp«ii

%& Hllm • ^ton^hss policy t&mwi l^9mw*9

Wtmt$ th* tl.S« ^^laatnt slight to isolate
the Ax«l»

fvm^ lOst of

(ki itojNSh 12, IWI, ^«me P. ii(^ar<tSf a hl^h-midcing Stiito

Dtpaxtfiifit tffieial» wis sent to tho Middlo Sist to totoi^sonpt ^ Bison*
hOMjr Ofl«t»iBO

im MOk

^9itie9

W^fpUMn capital ws

i^t iiielodad if} his ttissim*^^ tm ftihmmxf lWf$ Kias Satt4 daxing his
visit to imTim ai^^Kwoo^ his si^i^pwt (li«t a^ot aoooptsnoo) of tho dootriiMP
AftotiMi? s^iva by tha fmwimu fowotiMaiit daaigm# to shew its disfai^ to*
mwi liiS80x> mas Wishljigteo's afXoimtAt to |»te tilia adiitai^

of

^ BaflMiad Paet.^^
MsanmliilOt tiis lisaidiowe? I^tirina mas xointazpfetad* Ihe taxm,
'^amad a|^x«ssi<m* mn no leagox to ttftr to only a dizoot attack of m9
natiMi Inr aaotlMirf but also to atteiqpts to mmHiixm i:^o»WB8tasn Aaeab §m»
3^to»»il xvvolts «ith outsido aaaistanoo* Tim tai» "any

eamatRts

eountxy 6<»itrollad by intoxnational Conw«tis«'* MS mm to aoan a natiMi
with striMig tias i&Ui tha

iM o^«r woor^* B9yf>t aiui Sy»ia»

Iho dootrim Msa appliad for i3ia first

in J^idan «iwyt King Ikis-

sain's diwiesal of tha pxo-Kissoy Amb nationalist govomMnt of Pfwtiier
Kaith IftMMiloek,

Ult

cit*. p«

Sast Jotttnal. "Chywiology," Spring lf57, p. I6f.

In osdar not to antaf^lM Nassoar* Washington has xoi^inod fxo«
baooi^ a full naalsor of tlw Baghdad Pact. Joining tha ailitaxy eoMsittae
of #ui paet aada ^a lAriiitod Statos in all but in lagal t«x»s a i^ll
paaHdeipant in tha pact*
2® John W. %>iniar, Awagjean Foyoign Policy Sineo Itocld Wtr 11, (New
Yotki Frodariok A. Praogan mi)» p. m.

74

^Utinin tialmlsi «aiis«<l a ftnml 8triie» aiMi lavg* anti-Hnstaln and anti*
AMiriean ^hmcMiattatioBs in najejr Je^nian eitias. King AtsMin a«<Mia«4
iUiilNixiiati(»ial CcNHKmiui as bting zaspensibl* fm tfet OPisis* On Apx>il 24,
1957* th«

Starts aj^xossad its e<»ioafii tm tiit aitanatian ai^ dis-

pat^<i th# Si3(^ flaat to

fanb Hiditanmaaafi shdtas*^

llissat aeoisa^ th« tftiiteii Statas of baini

^ mm> to oust an

iatOAsoly nationalistie JcHiilaiiiaii fovoxnatat, of stteiiating maag Labanost
Chiristiaiis hostility towaird %)^t« aiul of atto^itli^ to fiwoxthxmr
Syjrian goyozfnwtit.^ Ha8aiz>> hcNMvax, 9psm%m$ to oadtvetaAfi^ llbitod
Statoe' €mmm wx tiio Syrian toflaa and its possiblo falling into Cmnmist hands. His obioetiwi to^ ll*S* stand m Syxia ins t»std m his
offinviotien ^t only a policy st^^rtad by Wm Airab w»rld ooHld sayo Syi^
fwm h»:e dilMBM.

Dui ^iriean govoztimint 8»«Md ^toz«in»d to isolato Kassat fwm tha
cost of ^ fmh noxld ai^ also to oxotoiso oe^oMie pxossim m his mglaMi*
St c<intinaad its

to^ anti^iiasMX Amb govofnnonts of

Labanoii» and J^rdan*^ Iho Bgyptiait Uaday oiqpteasod his f^inian sogaxding
UHitod Statas* latost aetivitios agtlnat hi». Ha doolatodi
Hit intoxosts of Egypt lit idtli gMd xolatians
with tlw Iftiitod StatMts. Bat in axo not xoady if oux
sovoxoignty is afjNetod**«.TNixo is a pxosnixo to
^lai^ Ottv lina of policy and to tSo it
to tha
United Sta^s* thaxo axo Aaoxioan aetiyitios to
htmdlliate us* Iho tl,S« is txi^Uig to isolai»
It is ai^lying aeoniaie pxossiixos* Ihon thaxo la

^ Joaohitt Joost»n> SB,* £ll*» P*
^ H,B, illisa

eit»» p« &1«

23 HM., pp. 50-3.

-m
AaerioiR pxepag«nd«.^
Tht Btzgtr of Syria and Bgypt under President l^eser's leadership in
February 19^« did not introdhiee any basio ohange In the relations betMten
the United States and ^e newly fcomd Iftiited Arab ^epublie*^ Washingtw
rather weleeoed tlw aewe because it rtsoMd Syria iwm a possible Coonunist
eoiiHF>* Oullos pointed out that ^e nerfor was a sign that ^e two Ofluntries
were detendned to airoid being taken over by international CoBsunisn.^
&i tihe mamx of l^» ano^er orisis oeeured in the Arab Middle East.
On July 14* a gtmp of natioflalist officers« led by l^igadier General Abdul
Karia KassMi* overthrew the prooWastem Iraqi i^nar^ical r<^ia» of King
Feisal*^ Ihi new Iraqi regiae did not teediat»ly withdraw froa the
Baghdad Paetf but such a mm was believed inevitable, the revolutiwi in
effect cancelled £raq*s nenbership in the alliance* thus tiie Arab nmber
mpm idii^^ pact had pivoted was no longer a stabilizing f<»ree* Ihe
tMited Amb Roj^blic hailed the revolution as a great victory i&t Arab
^ 2l3& Me*«w»el^. Hwember 25, 1957# p. 57.
^ Kei^ Mheelodc described the BWiger of Bgypt and Syria as folloiffi t
**In I956t Just before the nationalizati<m of the Svmz Canal Conpany, plan
ning for a close Egypto»Syrian political alliance had reached an advanced
stagof although a «iries of crises interveiMd, by NomMter* l%7, a Joint
session of the Egyptian ai^ Syrian Parliaaentc had unaniflMHisly ajf^rowtd a
fedtarral uni^ between the two counMes. Two aim^s later f^ese plans
af^roai^d fruition# But in Jamuryt l^» the fedteraticn id^ was drop*
pod in
of a nore coaprehensim aerger. According to I^sident Hasser*
Syrian political leaders caae to ae sayii^ everytiiing was a atss. I aet
wiHi all except
Coanunlsts. They told ae» *Qnly you can save us.
Liqtiidato our parties and join us
Bg^t«* OU»r reports suggested that
tim sudden decisl<m for a full union was proapted by the alarali^ growth
of Coanunist influence In Syria* These n^ports se«Hed to be boriM out
idien« m February I# Nasser established hlaself as absolute ruler over
the IMited Arab Bepublic (Bgypt and Syria) and provision was aade for a
single political party—the Iteti^l IMlim.**
c||*, p. 258.
26 H.B. Ellis, 2£.
p. 53.
^ S» Has ISa^ Tiaes. July 15, 1958, p. 1.
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Sm

tdOt Hit ftmnts In Itaq h«d • exitieal •lltet* Jyist a

littlt JMiss

liw M»1^s btlost ^ 1««0. x«V9l.iati<Mit on l^bxttary i7»

tilt p3E>o*Wastt3mt goraxs^Htot el King H^sstln tnttirtd lAto a ltdt»tti<m
wilii

atattixt was dttlgnttf Uf s^ngthtn Kitsttia's psttitloe amsiag

his pt^ltt stM tl liiea w»t« |»£o»Nit£ty Piti«stijiiaii hw&h »tfug«t8« TNi
8ii^ti«a alttt thA Ijfaili xtveltttioi nas Hacdly luipfiy iim th« yeong king*
On

ISt ItlMuiQii

^t MU^nshmmw D^trlm aiMt asletii tht

iaittd Statts fm ailitaty 8ti|^03rt» Jttdan aU# ztqotsttd Barltith Bilitaxy
aiil.^ Thi§

Statts stnt 14,^ trn^s inte Ijtiau^m*

t» Jtfdaa, Bari-

talA loMdlattly atut jMizatT^t tt pirettet Kiag }taas«in*s
his atssagt to Congitss m

M

ii, Mr* iiswihowtr pointtd mt ^t his

iteeisi^ to stud kmxUm tto&ps was aa Itptzativt st»p il tlit in^iiMiAdeiieft
mi ia^jrity #1 yibaa<^ «if te bt pztstJmNI. Iht Mtssagt staltd thatt
Uiiitid Statta Itttts ajrt kiting stnt to i«haa«i to
pTOttct AMxieaa liwas ai^ by tlwit pstttiMso to
atoist ^ ^rnmmmmt of Itkaaai in^ pxtsoxvati«H%
of Ithaiioa's ttsxit^rial iat^x^ity ai^ indtpti^aet,
havt htm 40mm4 idtai li» ISm
Statos
iMtional inttsNists and «iotld {itaet»»#«lffii shasw with
tibt <Soi«xiwwit of l«lMfi08^ vitw ti^t Hmm mmmU
in
dNwBonstrato a xul^ltstiitss of aggxtssivt {auif
post liiii^ tiny itlMnim oan
otwbat idtliittt j^ttesr
tviiaiuit of si^qppott fxmt ot^x Ititndly nations*^^
Iba Aatirioan GOVTXFIMNT caUtd fm INB»zg«a6y stssion of HM Stimrity
^n tht Cottnoil att en Jteiy 16, tht Anaviean toj^sontativo

^ B&Wm IS^ Ti»ts. Ftbwiaty IS, 19S8, p. I,
^ Jtolos Davids,
3S

sU., p. m*

Mgg^Tiats. July 16, 19S8, p. 1.

^ For ttxt of tht Bsssagt sto Fistwir and Kxinsky,|g. cit«»
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in lAbaium and
Th« p3irap9«al8 9f Pxtslitent EiMflhontsr
natitms*

mxm

eol^ly ma»iv»ii by tht Axab

l%«y «ec«pt«<i ^ i4ta of • Qteittd ifaitieiit-st^iirieod Davilopwtnt

Mtttic^ity tet

betti • lkiit«<i lotions p««)N» imm in th« Ili4di« last

«i^ Uliitt<l Hations* aenil^SHrini of lamdcasts.^
#

•

#

HM Undingi ef AMiiri^n Ktoriats in Ltbanon and tit#
pasatxoepoys to JofdNun

mm

di«pat<^ of British

notivatwi by Ststosm dtsizo to px«vtnt ^ two

Aarab oounts'ios itm boing *absoarbt<i* into Pxosi/iont NasMir's Onitod Atab
Rtpitblie*

Iho Iftst l^liovod ^t to bl(Mic tiNio 0}q^n8i<»a of tl>t U.A.R* in

thf MidiHt Sast «mld offostiiwiy
affairs of ttio azoa»^

blm ^ ttestofn*

Hmmvmr,

tho Sovdot lAiim's x>olo in tiio
9«S.«Baritish intovvontien eausad a

i>a:rticayiiariy QediUrd Statss' prostigo in tho A?ab iraafid.

In soppiirt of thU vUim, it sooiis no^ssairy to qfnota ojctonsivsly txm tlia
btWK^east by Homxd R.

of tiie

Coloidsia arosdoasting SystM on JMly

20, imt
•mmorn of tho ^ings that micos liMi (crisis so vneon*
aoniy ai^iguoys is tiiat titongh
MO ha^ 'to go in 1N> koop
fxm losing piostSfO, em aet of going in is eausing us
to loso pxostlgo. Tuo-t^ix^ of iM paro-WistcsR pajriia*
•ont of lotMmm no wsnt in to psrotoot is said to bo
^[i^sod to mr emdag, and pi>obably 90 posr oont of
Jflsdanian poi^lo opp^ «s fm osning in*
^Kiiirlining asbiguity* ei» intonist iUi tho Middio

43 FflO- toxt of tho rasoltttiwit so# Middio £asto«i Affaiyg. Ootobos*
19i8, p*
^

HoonoBdst. Aagiist i6» i%8, pp. 507-8.

45
n,
*'Psa«o to tiM iUddlo iast*«»Mio8o
Ml£X MJkS^. Potanisry 1, 1959, p. 76.
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of a naw l«bMia8a pmaieteBt (Sanatai ]^*ad C^hab) aiul of tiie spaady withdranMl of Aaavleaii <^raapa Ijr oa^pllanea with a sraq^st of tha naw govamnafit« lha paaea^ sototi«» of th« esiais put tha Unitad Stataa in a battair
poaition than aha w^l«l othandaa ha«a fownd hataalf
Tha avanta of tN» anaulng faw wm&iB

a notsbla DURNGFA IJI tha

^aricsaQ atti^nto tmmwi Pmaidant Naasar. Tha U.A.R.

«he daring

tha patiod 1935-1958 wis fagaidad a foa of tha Wiat, a Caanmist at(^a«
or a t^uraat to paaa«» bt&am In Asaxlean ayaa an inpoirtant faetor foar
atabiUty in tha MMl* Eaat*"^^ Ihia Malisati^a aane aa a stsult of ifasaair's
vicii^ attaoka m Amb CeiBMiniata alto warn baliavad to ba 9xtmmlif in^
fluantial in tlM naw Xxaqi xagiM*'^^ Iha Unitad States' policy to iaolata
tha U*A*R» ftm tha taat of tha Axab w«Krld whi^ had baan adoptad in aatly
1957 ma now i^ngad to lUuit of eoopaxatiim nitii Nassajr to block t^a ^vaad
of CaoBttniatt in^ Mj^la Eaat«'^
In aairly Ma^th 1^,^Iteitad Stataa gsantaid Firasidant Nassar'a 0*A«R«
$7 Billion in mmmdM and t««^nioal aid« Tha U.S* gwmmmmt alao x*ai»ad
to^nieal asaiataiMa

Urn Taotyiical Co^zatimi Afzawaant of 1951* Of

•Moa iapoftanoa waa t^ agxwMtaat bataaan PxaaiiNint Itesaair and Pzasidant
B^ana Blaok of tha l^ld BaiOCj, ihieh providad for $56 adllien loan to ispjt&VQ tho Suea Canal* Iha U«A*R« Pxaaldant also mtoeaadad in gattin§ ti^a
Ejqport-Xapoirt Bank and ti«a Qavalepaant ioan

H.B. Elliat SB*

to axtwid imm for ttM

PP* 73-4»

^ V9wa M. Daan» ••Paaea in tha Hlddla East-.-Whosa Job?"
m*
ailas Davids, jgg» cit«« p. 139.
Kaith mMpaloak, ^2* SSS** P*

82

6oii8tfti«TIE» #f savtf«T pxojoets IJI his
«iri#»i^ ef 9te«fi6Uiati^ in tlie l6$t*sn«0*A.R. telaiiois ms
^ afV9e»int of Fflmiasry
&l9im

1^9 bs^m th* U.A*R« and Bzritain tahiawby

tmaitoxr^ltias arising m% of tim 1956

(A tifiilix 8«ttl«wint ms xttidMid fettMHtn

mx mm

U*A«&« ai^ farane* ia Aagust

NeiflMiJ, dipl«wiitie »»JUti^ imtmm imdm ami Cairo mm rasmMl
OIL OEEIKABEX' L« 19^9*^ FOUTIWDNG TH« FV«N^U.A«B. XTF}«3»TI«A •FVHHWKIT*

^

e^^intarits «i@B«ci « trade afi««Mmt m Pa^Hiybair 23, I9&9«^ In lata

196],, iMdwtirvs, a ^ozt-tem attain in tlMi FtanecNO.A.il* telati<»i8 wit m»
stiltad txm ^0.A.E**s aecusatli^i df nim Ftaneten af ea»itietifii
aspi^fa aetivitiaa in Sg^t ai^ ef trying to aasatalna'^ Prasiitent liasaar* Die §wmp uliieh wis tei^daad of lour ati^rs af tlia effieial Ftaneh
C^BBdasiw m French Xntajrests in tha il*A.R*« tm iaw^r8> 9td Hm Jaomal*
ists mm te ba braay^jht to trial in Cair«*^ Hia U«A*R« attth^itiaa amaun*
cad tiui raleasa of Hm nina franelbfian bafera lyia trial was e««idttatad#
Dieir relsasa sranifaatad a dasire on tlia part al^|}*A«R. for eaaplata
franco^.A^R. za}^r9a<(^eiBtantt af^r fmmt mmqaim^ ^ riffht of salf^^»liiatim for Algeria, On ^ril 17, 1962 tiia tfiaitad Arab Rapuiblie
ann^Bieed its plan to have

'Hinited Arab Airlines'* start a new liiw be<->

tMien Cairo and Paris «^en dl|>losHiti« relations jtotmeen tlie tNo aoHntrias
B«$imiss Wseka Howmber 28, 1999»
107*8} see also Jules t^vids,
"Ihe Unit^ States and tiie Middle lastt 1953-1960,** Middle iaatern Alfaira,
May 1961, p. 139| si^ H*B» Ellis, {^« «it«, pp. 194'-6«
m

^ SddM

aal imml*

%Hng l?59, p. m.

aifslstt Oetober 1958, p. 332.

^ Jiiles Davids, *nrhe Iftiited States and the Middle Basts 1955-1960,••
JE* f|it*m p» 139.
Vera M* Dean, "Peace in the Middle Eaat«»«ilhQse J^^i" gg. eit.
Middle iastem Affairs, Jaimary 1962, p. 32»
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mm mtmmdrn^'^
9t Inlttd

fht
fairly 1959, ai^

MJUtiens,

Ijngta in

ptttiyie«d Hit naw AMsriean attifa^ immvi Kaasav# ia

6«Atimi^ ^lytwgli #airly 1962* iaexgt MaMrttot,
li^dNil* iatteim anal^t f«pi»rt«d to Apxil, 1!NI2,

Aiswsial»«l Pxtat
^8i(hitit Nassa? is

aaftfti«ti»@ im ini^asai acivMa^e aid iwm

Stttit* tlta

addad, "A stmm of t^lli^t visi'^art ftm Nashiagton Ims latladtd ^
»}vingi «»inair

^

and an Btmrnijn mMmt, ^hmyd HbBm*
Ni8s#jr*a dlflea.^
a«ie^

ws^sU (Ii«r9t S« Itediiwttt},
All mm ^it^ly a«lMi?ad intd

visiter hava indieatad 19.§* willliiiatas ^

past 4iiUtmmf6 nA^ Px^sidaRt lliamt* HM &«A.R, a«theiritita

ianadiataly twsp^Rdad bf t«iidiA9 EemmAm Miniitajr Abdal IknaiUi •l'4Cai8swii
aad a dtolagatic^ ef aj^xts t9 Wtshii^tfin tst emttt idLth
Mcoiatajry fmi and Amiiean aid olfieiaU*^^

Ap*il 18, 1962, p. 3.
Mi» Apfil 13, 1962, p. 9.
M Speicawmi Htviaw^ ApHl It, 1962, p. 19.

^bifeamatimial

aiAPTiR m

«mn<m
smm mm
ttiay #1 iSios* 1## mm
e«nniiiiini haw ICH^ botn
1^ i&m
«ii4 fGZfottiiit «nd If
tiwy as* fwwii^xt^ isem Um to tini«
it i« «•
liho hmi^ht
sislot'toM to ttioir poi^lot* this is
ifey I m eomfimvd tiwt lit* ttiisi?
mill, fiin no laufoXi hf playinii Ultm
imgatoiy »oU of « lifh^iir ifiiinst
eoflmmisB* oiwn if it my i4n hfyst
fm
tim boingii goo4 piMs of
iNirtsia
in ttm i^t^tialist
oimttios*
Nikita S. Khjmthehoir^
Hui A»ib poii^lo mfe ij^smssodl by^ Seviot staiMl dsurinf tiui S^jc
oirisis. Thoy bolifv«i l^t tt» l^ssi«» ultimte to Brittin* Wsiim, «ai
Ismml to halt thoix* i^jrosei^ii against igypt playad a m^os' srolo 1^ tkm
ttne«»iditiMal ndthdvawil ol An33Lo-FttAcH->l8i»Mili fo»Gos ttm %yptian
tsfi^itoty* Nistotii oli»ofv»«a* of^^tiim that Hm Sawiot namiBd ^tiivoiro^
to Urn tluma ^wading (sonntriae was mant iMily to firi^htoii thm* and #Mt
tha &9vi«^ Minftjr li^i^d to ^aash a mieltay
aot tmxk ia|»»sa

to <ial«iid Igypt^a sova*

Wm Ai»b miM* Iho kjmh paapla mm

eommmd only with^ ftissian stt^ attack afainst

IHMdaars aiNl mm

SmUt ajq^xaasad williiigmsa t& i)a»tieipata in tha ^foiisa ol Bgt^t* i:ht
S0iiriat taeties in faia^ p^iatity In Bgi^t and tha fast of tha Axab wsrld
iiasa sttoaassihil*^ Iha Sovlat (Tnion bagan to ai^ar as tim i«Mioybtod dafandav
^ Uipartmnt of Stata, Sgyiat Wofid Oiitiook. pablieatiwi
(Ibshingtafiy ^ly l?©9), p* ais#
^ fet

saa W«W« {Qaiski, s&* SSS*» P*
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te tossia

(and efhty Sovlat ea^llitas). & ad4ltii»R» Motesir axitealtd

exadits at l€M» intaJTtst f^ata

pat ^t) ta E^t»^ tha Savlat alfialall

saxvay af Seviat aaslitaaea te tNi l^dla Saat (aa xaptcNteaad l>y Hl&lla
Mutrnm Affairs«

l.9^» pp» WMt) giwa an aeeaMiit al ^ {jtoh*

jaata t^t Mta ta Iw eaaatmatad

a S«iriat«>%)i^tljift

aU

agaNMBanti
•••IR
Unitad AiNik l^^Ua» Savlat tixm ham baaa
aaaistiiii tR s^tesi^l^ and anlafiflag l@@ psrojaetat
Inatodifig alx antaipiiaas in
Ummm ai^ mth"
fmet&m aatal
six «ii^ifia»l9ttildiRt plant*•
tiiaiva antayptiaaa in tha ail atid dbrndml instaatty
(MBSNm ^MHs ana a^-ptodiaini plant* tm pimmm*
«a«itleai antaxpyiaaa and ana plant fc»r nl^ia lax^
tiiiiata)* Hiay ata aiaa aaaisting to tha e«»straction
al a ^ipyaxd, i^ixw
pianta, a taiiMad»
at
aiMi iinr^atitti si^%n» and axa aisa
eatyylnsi aat gaalagiaal paro^paating* astaMiahinf a
mialaax physies iab«arati^» and installing an at«d.e
2aaati»r»
#

•

«

l^aiitent lliasa:r*6 Strang «i^ositiai) ta ^a iiaanhaiiay IJaetriiM-*
tmf it aimflia^d ndltli his dtiva fat Atab ^aiatahip and Ax«h nanttality in
tha eold imt^aainei^d adt^ lfaaei»r*s ^Jaatims to ptavant ^ ataati^a af
a Wis'tosn-inapiMd alliaiu»i in ^a Miii^la Eaat* tha daatriUMi «na dbnaumwd
hy ^a Sanriats as a plan af ^tad Stataa iapatialistia daHinatian of ika
Wlddla iaatatn aaun^ias#^® On ^amiaty 12# l^7» ^ U.s.s.R» isaoad a
atatmant wttning that tba docladina eiKtld laad to mv in tite ataat f(Mr

SM«s
also ^laa
<*lha tMltiNl Statas and tha M^ddla
Eastt 11^1960.,»
eit«. p« ISSf and IhoMs %• Pinlattat. gataian
Palieyt tha Maxt Mia»i tlaw Ymk* Haa^t ai^ 6tatiiats» I9^h P*
ittddla Baatatn Affaits. Maireh I9B7, p. 107.
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Ctartainly airl;* ate do not wtot to tuom hlA into i Cmmmi&t

a
•f!^ Iw

not milt to tozn us into nationalistft."

mfwm

Md#) %inpt*s oo^A^e aiii |>olitloal ai^iticNst mntH

xeeo^niaai liiy F>so8iiant ^tsot miito# to koop Ma sapxtssiosi of total
CoMK^iaf^ stpaYati

distl^ust ftm hia frios^ly sotati^a nAtl)

iot Vltdm* Aftejr #ui

Sew*

Bgiyptiaii t3m49 solatiena vrith tiio CooMe-

aiat bloe hoo«aa mwf 9tmm» %ll>t had lost wrat of Itot tfaditisml Mtst*
01^ anyluits im BgfptUn oottoii* aio was ^ilytng new
i» Imy Wm eMi^, iliii^ fyemisho^ hot

CmmmUt

6@ posr oont of Bs^t's

•x^ngt li^owi*^^ fNtt1^f8M»xo, Nassov ha(i to iipomi on tho SovloiNt imt
annnints. ttm Soirlot llni«i in

1^7, 4tlimx94 to Egypt tloroo sub-

mHm9$ th& first suhBavines to ho ao^itod by any Mttddlo iastoim powot*^^
In gonopalf Bflpt was hasioaily eoasittod to toeoivtng tim §mUt$ mlUUfy
aid*^^ Most iKpmetmt of aU Khimshi^v's aimoyneaaMnit en Oo^Amt? 33»
that his fovaznaont ha4 agiooii to ptovitii Bsin^t wiH)400 siUion xoblos
(littlo

$100 iiiliien dolla^e) to oanHlits Immxd tiia eonstmiotiim of tiui

wi^ 498im4 i$igh Ammtt Dm*^^ tl^w mis tgammnt, tho toon wetttd ho topaid in twoivo aamaai instalXnontst hoaa^ a S| pot eont mm$l intotost*
tiw fitst instaltwint to ho paid in 1964* Tht mm»f so paid vnitld ho spont
m piit^uising oooBoditios ftoK tho lAsitod Atah iopyibiie* tho Soviet fovotniMnt «^ld atso ptovldo iNictoioai assistanoo ^ tlM ooaplotien of tho fitst
8ta§« of^dm m an sftood dato*^^
15 H.B, litis, 2B»
^1^,1 £eb M

p, 17.
ili-« p*

H»B* lilia,
sit** p* 1^9.
Koi^i lQiooloek» fg. Cit«» p, 204,
Fot toxt
of tho agtowMntf soo Middto Bastotn Affairs*
Fohtitaty 1939* p* 78*

Ane^t

f«sr

iillllngiMr«s te pirawott friondly x«Utii«i8

idL')^^ SevlAts iMi« ilito86^*s Mfttiiness to

Pjrt8i<lint Hassftt tt

^ Ittdtv tf I2it Amb wKrl(i»^ the Smritts suppeirttd Httstr's polleits tfii
•nnifttttd tiitir antdinttt t« «otptx«tt witli his ht«)^ df Amb nttlontiisB.^
Bills* Warn n.A.R* ittidtr btlitinid Hmt his smmtry's In^ytst ;rt«piftd
ht mt bt ta etttspe^n against Inttxnationai CemttinisR* As
Hasstiya fityiul» Prtsident Htesstr's ^st^ ai(te and edit^ of ikX'Mam
ntwspaptjr* saiii in Caito in ttrly Jaana:ry i957» "Egypt's aliianot ndth the
Soviets Mas* tvm the Egyptian point of view* a ^ftnsive Idling. Bgypt had
little diioite but to t&m to Ifa^seowy since (^ly the Soviets mm idlling to
fianish

the 0«A*R* felt it needed.*^

• *

*

The events foll^iRlng ^ Ixaqi ftevelutim of JUly 19i8t tooufht
strikilii devel4^F^nt8 in Itesser's xtlatioi» with the SovUt Union* Zanqi
PxwBier Ab^l Katlai KassMif instead of bfiaging Imq into a ttaion «i^ the
ttelted A«»b Repttblie as Rasser had OKpeeted* folltwid an indepeiiMjent poliey*
Katsen de»laje»d In Dtoetdbex 19S8» fhat h9 would pjnisejrve Zxtq's "lactependenee
and s«iwe]Nil9nty> at the sow tUw doing evesrytihing possible f&x ^e beiMfit of tilt A»ib pe^le***^ The e«iise<|iienoe of Kasswi's sove to psraserte
Iraq's indepeiMieiM^i was a split between PttKiex Kasseo^s followsirs and

W.W, Kttlski# SB* SJIM P- 568#
Ibid., p. m*
^ As (poted in H,B, Ellis,

SlS«» VP* H'-B*

23 As quoted in Jeaehia Joesten,

eit». pp 212-13*
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tlw l(n»st peiat
Kasi^ir ttvult m Mati^ 3, 1959* In
«an% of PsrwBiar Kas«mn»^

3b»iq asainst tiw eantx«l 9«ni«;m-

n^isti^ was extighac! by tita Ixaqi aijr ttmm

ai»i Um pt&^mamA9t Ixaqi nilitla. Pi>«sl<iant Haaaat x«aeta4
Atafe CoMHBiista at agants 9I **a fotalgn p««fet*"^ Biis ma
$1 a Mir »l wMNia Ma^waa

damwyielni
liegiRnIng

and Cait@. ^ Ma^ 16, 1^, alta:r sign

ing a $i!irlat-Isa(|l aaa^NMle aid afsramant, mdair nM.^ tha l}«S«$*R. plad@aii
idlllQA zttltlaa

at tadmieal aqnj^Mwnt ai»d iM^svlsaa, Khtush^MW at

a Ki«Hdlin taai^tl^ tm tha £r»qi ^itela^atiaci ae^sad FiN»aiite«it Masaat al
**adiiptiii3 1^ lanpuiffa df tha inpaj^ialleta" in mmimmim fmh Cawwuilite*
iite aaid

Pfaaliant Haaaar baing "a vathar yci»ng wan ai^i mVtmx hat*

Nia^, tGi^ «pso hlKaall mm tiian his statKjra pa]»dtt»4»**^ Osallangins
Fiwsidant liasat'a tlala aa

«f all Amh fMic^laa mith^t i^aird

t« tha. InlUiyaat of Hia aaiMifata Asmh atoitas#

Swiat fmAm ad^i

It is aaidi that Amb nationallm allagadly staada
ab«wa tha in^raats of saparata Axab stataa, aitMnra tlw
mtavaata #f diffavant «ietiafna @1 thi p^latiw In Um
Amh aauntriaa* UMIII* la no doubt t^at the »i|airity of
AtaM hava &mmm intitaaite In iiw ats^la against
colonial slavairy. Btit aftair
e^try ha» tid itsalf
of f^igin daadnatiimt tha JU^tataata of 1^ pa^la oannot
ha ifmnrad* £adlaad tha Intairaate of all Axaba oawiot
ooinoiia*
tha al^wopta to ifnova, ondar oomis
of natl«»lieB»
Inta^at of aa{»i»ita saoti^ia of tha
p<¥»ttiati^.
Sntaioat of tha noxkii^ pafi¥>la» am
tintanabla

^ M* lis il^

Sapffigt. Mafoh 30, 1959, pp. 37-9.

29 Kaith ihaalook,
mn MM mm*

p. ^4.
m-* p- 217.

SiRfiot Wogld Outlook, ag. sH., p. 217.

intemstieail CemualsB.

dtUviMd m Max^ 30» 19S9» h# saids

M» tried net to mfc* the leeal eetlvltles of Arab
CeuKmlste la Xr«q or Syrle a teaewi fer any elaeh with
I^esla as
as ^ssla did net Interfere In our affairs*
Ne were tri^Uig te eenvlnee ««a>selinis tilMt CeMBunist
Parlies in eitr «euntries ware independent of intesniatienal
Cfiiwi»ii«iR« Mi feu^ tliat titey ware net» ai^ ^at was «iiy
I called th«K CesHiunist stoofes. They carried ^t orders
and instractiens tc ll^piiMite patriotic and national
elemnts in order to place our cotintry inside the sones of
CcMHenist infl^Mince* Ha mm suddenly faced by flagrant
interference in our internal affairs by Sussia* There was
e^oamte evi^nce of an alliaiMM beiNien Wm iosslan
ai^ CcMBonists working against us inside our country.^^
Frc» these 1^ speeches it could be conelu<ted that Soviet-Arab re*
lati<ms haira entered a new p^ase* The leaders of the Kreslin se«Md to
have given up the idea of dealii^ with President Kasser as the leader of
the Arab world* The new i^se wes diaraeterized by a Soviet desire to
establish close and friendly relstltms with the individual Arab states* even
^ou^h meh relations night eeum a rmrse effect to $0viet»Q.A«R* friend*
^hi^. H^verir

Soviets have gone ahead with tl^ir plans and conaittMnts

for ecfmomic and tectoical assistance to Urn fftiited Arab Republic* This
was d«»ie (tespite the enti-CoBwtmist line maintained by President !iasser*$
govemaent*
Xn April 1^9 PriMaier Khxuehchev took the initiative In bringing
about a reconciliation in Soviet*a*A*R* relaticms* He wrote Ifasser a per*
sonal letter In viiich he esqpresmd his desire for a closer and more cordial
relationship wii^ the U*A.R*^^ In late May* l%9« Al-Ahraa. ooHnenting on
Prmier Khrushchev's statMwnt to an Indian Joumallst that the pe^le of
U1.A*R* had no

sincere and true friend ^an the Soviet Iftiiont wrot»i

32 As quoted in Keith i^elock*

fit*. p* 275
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«fid ae«^s«d t^MMi el sMiiiiig favoar ndtii titt ffttittd

ftraydt eoneltt^ by dtelav^ tliat tb« Sevlat ltol<!«i

Sevitt*A»ib

fviifid8hl|} iixl slaraivt te stMng^n
KsMivwr, NIIU« imlm eanitietad ^israv^h

ease »^ia by hvVti

siitst tha tfisptita did not saan t@ hava eansad any viaibla attain m
S0«riat-tf»A«!l. yalatiaes*
Oi J^nyiary !,&» I96&g to ^aa^irfc Soviet dasixa to asaiJita^ fyiandiy
xaiatieNoa tidtN ^0«AttR.t Pimniav Khxttsh^iaiF in a pass^X Mstasa to
Pzasi^nt Niaiajr anp^assad hit emfi^dkinaa that ^a High Aswan Qui usttld
ba e«p}<«^ m a^MNhia* Utii Maaaga* irtiicii ms datimiji^d by Soviat
Ministat of Eiao^ie Pmmw S^tions Igiiati I* Mivikav, assttvad tha ll*A*t«
Fa^sidant of eoBtii^ad Sotdat aqai|»Mint ai^ ta^ieai assistanea fm tNi
40
6e«piat» e(!»$txttOti<»i of tlw

Ibid.> Jtana 18, 1961, p. U.
i7t i%2. p. n*
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liMiuix* has this paiiey mniiastad itsalf soxa viviiiiy tha» in tha
Miidla last*

Haxa» tha Mast has alwi<^ pTacaadbd on tha assu^ti^ ^t

if it axair^d anengh poiitieal.» aocmonio* and aiiitazy pmsmtt, aiKi if it
offasrad tar^in ifMiu<«»ints**«ieh as financial aid—it ^ml4 »aka Ayab
govazimants sign traatias m antai? allianaas iragairdlass of the eonaacipanoae
to tha national intozests of ^a Asab paella*
lha Wast has failad to sae that ^ A^bs—lika otlia? peopla'»-az»
natu^lly inoXinad to placa thair em aspirations and intarasts abeva tha
aspisaticKTis

intozasto of aithax paarty to tiia East»1ii8t e<»ifliet« Indaady

part el tiia sisum^tstai^ing batwatan tha A»b paapla ami tita

pOMats

Atting the last daea^ night be attrifaatod to tha WKsteim inclinati^ of
viewing Arab nati^liim prJ^riiy ttm tha angle of tiie oold war and of
exiMeting Arab 8ttb<»rdinati^ to Nastam positiim m eeld war issiMS*
On ^e^r hand» tlia Soviet {liii«o» mhile being idbielogieally at ochis
Willi Arab nationaii«R» has attenptod to shM» Itot its ralati^ witli tha
Arab p»9pl» ware not dictated by Russian interest in Hie cold war*
The Soviets have proved by ^ads their readiness to offer eoonoaiic and
•iiitory aid to any Arab e<xtntry without dktaandij^ aHiatus amd withoat
f^ing it into subordiiMtion. Moreover, by their reeogniti«A of* and
assistance to« Arab naticMnalisat t^te Soviets won t}» friendship of
pe^le.

Asmb

Sovieto have also profitod fron '^eir encouraging of the neu

tralist ton^ncy in ^e Arab countries» sinee sui^ a tondency would con
ceivably diainish the l«8stom influence in these countries.
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eiNTiMznins eolonlalim it sh«ild suppoirt th« prineiplo of s«lf*dNit»iniiiati^
th« iMidilf Eastf

Qliil^d Statos enjoys ono na^zal advan^ge* i*»*»

it has novax had any colonial activitios in the aMa. ^ BNist show the
Ajrab pei^le h«t unterstanding and xespect of theiir naticmalistie aspirations
and of ^it nofi-alignMnt policy*
Arab nati^lim is fair noxe incoa|>atible witii CoowRtisn Hum with
Mtstetn interests. As a nattet of fact. President Masser is e^i¥ineed l^t
local C^BNKiiiist parties snorted by ttf Soviet bloc are potentially the
fteatest ^xeat to Arab unity wider his leadervhl^. XdeologiiMlly, Arab
natifiialisa an^ CosaunisK sees not likely to exist sidb by side. It is
believed t^t Nasser would i«^er accept ftestem cooperatiem than ^issian
aid* iteshington oust realize l^is fact and should adi^t a policy based m
coqperati<M» and uncfairstai^ini. this policy shwild h« based en
tion of a fact that if

reeogai*

Mist desires to keep l&e Middle last ^t of Cm^

ffiunist influence» it cannot affojNI to lose the friendship and sya^a'^y ef
the leader of an ijq>ortant ccKint^ SJEJ the area, "^le United Arab iepublic*
It seeas that a mw Aoerican ai^roach toward President Hasser and
th* Arab naticmalisa Aoveeent viliich he chaapitNAs shcftild pay^ retards to
the following cbjectives* (I) Hie eliainatiim of Vtm rennants of AngloFrench col^ial possessicms in the Middle East* The existence of t^se
poseessi^t such as» for example* Aden, and Bahnin, is a renin^r to
Arab pe^le of the past eolwriial activities of these tm pcwersf (2) iNe
support of Arab nationalisK and Arab unity| (3) the adoption of nore i«*
partial approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict* and 'Uie sear^ for a solutiim according to United Nations decisi^si {President Ntaseer has declared
several tines that if Israel accepts all the United Katicms resolutiems* he
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«f»M» to fivop his hostility towtsd th«t stote.)^ (4) Urn ox'teasion
of aid to tNi ht%h oMBitrios to mstj mi^i modod oeonenio and a^ial
dovoloixMiett ai!^ (S)^ ^11 aoooptaneo of tlui Anb dtoiaro to jpcnrao its
{»olioy of n««i-Milifiintiit in Urn fast-Wtst o^nfliet.
A h«polttl lo^ at 9mm wmt »iooat Misteii» aofos %&mw4 P»o«id«nt
l^seo# my siig^ost ^t a iww {^so in lUstosni-Ax^b solatia Miy bo in tht
offing*

^ Hho wmt inp«»rtant tl.19* xosoltttiaa c<m^s»iiii tN» oottloMiit of tho
AMb*X$»aoli eonfliot me that 1947«<>1948 oalling m Xsraol to zolin^ii^
aboat iawnty por oont of hor prosont tonriteary to
Palostinian Axobs and
also to adnit '^oso Atab fofu^oos nHling to 90 baok to tiMijr old zosidoAeoe
new wdoy Itvaoli sovoioignty* Sto» Itothoy Eliot» "^(Mld tfa* U»S. Soli
A3ea» to israol.** fwroian Policy aallotin. Janua^ 15, 1^, p. 3.
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